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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF WORK INJURY ARISING
FROM A NEUTRAL ORIGIN NOT COMPENSABLE
Latthrop v. Tobin-Hamilton Shoe Mfg. Co.1
An automobile, left running on a service station drive, was accidentally
started on a driverless, runaway journey which culminated when the car crashed
through a window of the Tobin-Hamilton shoe factory. The claimant, an employee of the Tobin-Hamilton Company, was working near the window and sustained personal injuries for which she instituted an action for benefits under the
Missouri Workmen's Compensation Law.2
Section 287.120, RSMo 1959 provides that in order for an accidental injury
to be compensable under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Law the accident must have arisen "out of" and "in the course of" the claimant's employmenta
The employer and his insurer stipulated 4 that the claimant was in the course
of her employment when injured, but denied that the accident arose out of her
employment.
The Industrial Commission affirmed a referee's findings that the accident did
not arise out of the claimant's employment and therefore was not compensable.
On judicial review the circuit court held that as a matter of law the injury did
arise out of her employment. The employer appealed this determination to the
Springfield Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the circuit court was reversed
and the Industrial Commission's award reinstated.
Application of this statutory requirement to varied fact situations has been
the principal issue in numerous Workmen's Compensation cases which have reached
the appellate courts. 5 Although the courts in ruling on cases of this nature have
continually reiterated that there is no all-embracing definition for "arising out of
1. 402 S.W.2d 16 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966).
2. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Laws, ch. 287, RSMo 1959.
3. The specific language of 287.120, RSMo 1959 provides:
[TIhe employer shall be liable ... to furnish compensation ...for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment ....

4. Lathrop v. Tobin-Hamilton Shoe Mfg. Co., suprz note 1, at 18.
5. The majority of cases reaching the appellate courts on this issue involve
injuries caused by a force which was not under the employer's control. See Pierce
v. Luce Mfg. Co., 371 S.W.2d 351 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963) (injuries sustained when
employee fell on glass while attempting to avoid being struck by wind-blown objects, held not to have arisen out of his employment); Ries v. De Board Plumbing Co., 186 S.W.2d 488 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945) (an at-work injury sustained
when employee attacked by unknown assailant, for unknown reasons, held not to
have arisen); Kripplaben v. Jos. Greenspoon's Sons Iron & Steel Co., 227 Mo.
(119)
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employment,"8 they have nevertheless held that in order for an injury to arise
out of a claimant's employment it is essential that a causal connection exist between the employee's duties or conditions of his employment and the resulting injury. This connection must be such that the injury is a rational consequence of a
hazard which is logically related to his employment. 7 In addition to the causal
connection-rational consequence factors, it is required that the risk to which the
employee is exposed by reason of his employment be greater than the risk to which
the general public is exposed in the same area. 8
In her attempt to support the circuit court's judgment, the claimant in the
Latlhrop case relied on both the "street hazard doctrine" and the theory that her
employment exposed her to an unusual or special risk of harm from accidents,
such as the one that did in fact injure her.9
The purpose of the street hazard doctrine is to assist the court in finding the
causal connection and rational consequence in situations where the existence of
these factors is obscured by confusing facts or unusual circumtances. 10 The
principle recognized and developed is that when an employee is required, by conditions of his employment, to use the streets, the hazards or risks which are inherent in their use become risks of his employment.,' Therefore, if an employee
is injured in the street by a hazard which is inherent in the use of the street, a
sufficient causal connection is present between the conditions of employment and
the injury, so as to find that the injury was a rational consequence of an employment hazard.' 2 Given this connection, the injury will be held to have arisen out of
3
the claimant's employment.'
A number of jurisdictions have expanded the scope of the street hazard doctrine to include injuries which occur in dose proximity to the street as a consequence of an accident that originated in the street because of an inherent street

App. 161, 50 S.W.2d 752 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932) (injuries sustained as a result of
extreme heat, held not to have arisen out of the claimant's employment). For
unique cases in this area see Gregory v. Lewis Sales Co., 348 S.W.2d 743 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1961); Scherr v. Siding & Roofing Sales Co., 305 S.W.2d 62 (St. L. Mo. App.
1957); May v. Ozark Central Tel. Co., 272 S.W.2d 845 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954);
Long v. Schultz Shoe Co., 257 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953).
6. Heaton v. Ferrell, 325 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959), and cases
cited therein.
7. Toole v. Bechtel Corp., 291 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1956); Liebman v.
Colonial Baking Co., 391 S.W.2d 948, 950 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
8. Kelly v. Sohio Chemical Co., 392 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. En Banc 1964); cases
cited supra note 5.
9. The positional or "but for" theory, under which recovery is allowed on a
mere showing that claimant's employment required him to be where the injury occurred, was expressly disavowed by the claimant. The theory previously had been
rejected by Missouri courts in Williams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 332
S.W.2d 296, 299 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960).
10. Liebman v. Colonial Baking Co., supra note 7, at 950.
11. Wahlig v. Krenning Schlapp Grocery Co., 325 Mo. 677, 29 S.W.2d 128
(1930); 1 LAsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, § 9:00 (1966).
12. Liebman v. Colonial Baking Co., supra note 7, at 954.
13. Id. at 951.
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risk. 14 By way of dictum in Liebman v. Colonial Baking Co.,' 5 the St. Louis Court
of Appeals expressed a willingness for a similar expansion of the street hazard
doctrine. The claimant in Lathrop urged the Springfield Court of Appeals to accept the Liebman dictum and thereby bring her non-street injury within the
street hazard doctrine. The Court, while neither approving nor disapproving the
proposed expansion, held that the street hazard doctrine had no application to
the claimant's case because, even under the proposed expansion, the accident must
have originated in the street.' 0
The second test' 7 which the claimant relied on to support the circuit court's
judgment was the "special hazard" theory. Under this test a claimant must establish that his employment subjected him to an increased risk of harm, which is not
shared by non-employees in the same area.' 8 In addition, the employee must prove
that there was a causal connection between his injury and the increased risk
sufficient to warrant a finding that the injury was caused by the special hazard
to which his employment exposed him. 19 The respondent in the Lathrop case
argued that she was exposed to an increased risk2O because of her employment
and that this risk was responsible for her being injured.
The court of appeals held that the employee's contention that she was exposed to a special hazard had merit and that reasonable men could find that the
required factors of causal connection and rational consequence were present However, the court also determined that equally reasonable men could find that the
required factors were not present. Since the question on appeal 2 ' is whether
the Industrial Commission could reasonably have made the award it did, and not
whether another result would have been permissible, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and reinstated the Commission award.
The result reached in this case places a significant burden on the employee who
was not connected with the hazard which injured her, while at the same time it
completely exonerates the employer who was connected with the hazard to the
14. 1 LARSON, op. cit. s-upra note 11, § 9:50.
15. Liebman v. Colonial Baking Co., supra note 7, at 952.
16. Ibid. The accident in Lathrop originated a few feet from the street on a
service station drive.
17. The claimant also raised the assault doctrine. This theory requires a
showing of an increased or unusual exposure to injury from assault before an
assault will be held to have arisen out of a claimant's employment. The controlling principles are the same as those which govern the special hazard doctrine.
The court discussed the claimant's contentions in connection with the special
hazard doctrine. For cases discussing the assault doctrine see Kelly v. Sohio Chemical Co., supra note 8; Gregory v. Lewis Sales Co., supra note 5; 1 LARSON, op. cit.
supra note 11, § 11.
18. Cases cited note 5 supra; 1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 6:20.
19. Schmidt v. Adams & Sons Grocer, 377 S.W.2d 564, 566 (K.C. Mo. App.
1964).
20. The claimant asserted the fact that she was required to work in front of a
tinted window which was located adjacent to a "T" intersection, as evidence of a
special hazard. She alleged that the tint in the window kept her from being forewarned of the crash.
21. Williams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 9, at 299, 300;
Barton v. Western Fireproofing Co., 326 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
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extent that the location he selected for his operations exposed his employees to
such risks. Given this anomaly, would another result have been permissible in
Missouri? Certainly section 287.120, RSMo 1959 does not expressly require that
the causal connection and rational consequence factors be prerequisites for an award
of compensation. However, the statute does require that in order for an injury to
be compensable it must have arisen out of and have occurred in the course of a
claimant's employment. 22 An award of benefits to the claimant in Lathrop, after
it was determined that she was not exposed to a special hazard, would in effect be
granting compensation solely because the employee was in the course of her
employment when injured. Such a result would violate the legislative intent clearly manifested by the dual statutory requirement for compensation.23
Although a small minority of states have dispensed with the "arising out of"
requirement and award benefits for all injuries occuring in the "course of" an
employment, 24 the majority of jurisdictions require an injury to arise out of as
well as occur in the course of a claimant's employment 25 and are inclined to deny
compensation to a claimant who sustained injury under circumstances similar to
26
those in the Lathrop case.
As between the employer and employee, an award which places the loss from
accidental injury entirely on the party least equipped either to bear it or to pass
it on to society is questionable. Nevertheless, so long as legislative intent is so
clearly manifested by the dual statutory requirement, it is doubtful that a contrary result will be reached by the courts.
JAMEs D. ELLIS

22. See note 3 supra, for specific statutory language.
23. Howard v. Ford Motor Co., 363 S.W.2d 61, 65 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962);
Williams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 9, at 298; Staten v. Long-

Turner Constr. Co., 185 S.W.2d 375, 379 (K.C. Mo. App. 1945).

24. 1 LARSON, op. cit., stpra note 11, § 6:10.
25. Ibid. Forty-one states require that an injury arise out of, as well as occur
in the course of, the claimant's employment.
26. Id. § 11:31.
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LICENSEE-INVITEE-TEST
Robidoux v. Busckh

On June 30, 1960, plaintiff, an eight year old girl, visited Grant's Farm, a
well known showplace in St. Louis County, owned by defendant, August A.
Busch. She was in the company of a relative and twenty other persons of the
Kempt Drive Improvement Association. The secretary of that organization obtained permission for the group to visit Grant's Farm. While there, plaintiff was
run over by the wheel of a wagon pulled by six miniature mules. The mules had
bolted after two "tame" elephants entered the courtyard where the mules stood.
Plaintiff obtained a judgment of $8,000 in circuit court, and defendant appealed.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals, reversing the judgment on other grounds,2
announced by dictum that plaintiff was a licensee, not an invitee, because she
failed to prove that her "visit was of real benefit or interest to defendant." 3
This holding reaffirms earlier Missouri decisions which classified persons going upon the land of another as trespassers, licensees, or invitees. More importantly, Robidoux reasserts that, in Missouri, the most important factor in
making this classification is the purpose of the visit and not whether there was
an actual invitation. 5 Thus, in distinguishing between licensees and invitees, a
licensee is "one who enters the premises for his own purpose and with the express
or implied consent of the possessor." 6 An invitee is one who enters the premises
with this same consent, but who is there for some purpose of real benefit or
interest to the possessor, or for the mutual benefit of both.7
The distinction between licensee and invitee is of paramount importance, because the possessor of land owes a different duty to each. To an invitee, the
occupier owes the duty to take ordinary care to prevent his injury.8 This duty
applies to both affirmative conduct and natural or artificial conditions. 10 To a
licensee, however, the occupier is liable only for wantonness, an intentional wrong,
or active negligence;" and the licensee "takes the premises as he finds them."' 2

1. 400 S.W.2d 631 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
2. The court reversed on ground that plaintiff failed to show defendant knew
of a habit or tendency of the mules to run away.
3. Supra note 1, at 636.
4. Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazo & Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo.
1952); Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 1041, 185 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1945).
5. Stevenson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 348 Mo. 1216, 1219, 159
S.W.2d 260, 262 (1942); McCleary, Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to
Persons Injured While On the Land, 1 Mo. L. REv. 45, 59 (1936).
6. Twine v. Norris Grain Co., 226 S.W.2d 416, 420 (K.C. Mo. App. 1950).
7. Gilliand v. Bonurant, 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W.2d 679 (1933); Savage v.
C. R. I. & P. R. Co., 328 Mo. 44, 40 S.W.2d 628 (1931).
8. Argus v. Michler, 349 S.W.2d 389, 392 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
9. Richey v. Kemper, 392 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Mo. 1965).
10. Gruetzmacher v. Billings, 348 S.W.2d 952, 957-58 (Mo. 1961).
11. Id. at 959.
12. Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 185, 120 S.W. 1, 3 (En Banc 1909).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 14

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Early decisions, both English' 3 and American, 14 make the distinction between licensees and invitees turn on whether an express or implied invitation was
given. In the late nineteenth century, in Plummer v. Dill,15 Massachusetts repudiated the "invitation" distinction and decided that the determining factor was
whether an economic benefit was conferred upon the possessor of land. A large number of jurisdictions 16 and the Restatement of Torts17 subsequently espoused the
economic benefit requirement.
In Missouri, the leading case of Glaser v. Rotkschild 8 took the first step
toward establishing the economic benefit test, stating that "a licensee who goes
upon the premises of another by that other's invitation and for the other's purposes

. . .

becomes an invitee."' 9

These words hardly indicate that the "purposes" benefited must be of an
economic nature. Subsequent cases, however, through a restrictive interpretation
of Glaser, have implicitly narrowed the criterion to one of economic benefit 20
"Real benefit or interest" is equated to an economic benefit. In light of this tendency, the dictum in Robidoux can be construed as meaning that plaintiff cannot
be an invitee because her visit conferred no economic benefit on defendant Busch.
It is submitted that (1) this result was reached by applying an unduly
strict interpretation of what constitutes economic benefit, and (2) the time is
ripe to re-examine the Missouri approach to this area of tort law.
It is hard to accept the court's conclusion that plaintiff's visit conferred no real
(economic) benefit on the defendant. Although an admission ticket is necessary,
there is no charge therefor. Nevertheless, the entire non-profit operation of Grant's
Farm could not be, from the standpoint of taxation, without economic benefit to
the defendant. Defendant is also likely to derive a benefit in the form of goodwill
from those who visit Grant's Farm. Indeed, defendant appears cognizant of the
value of goodwill and advertising; free samples of his well known beverage are
distributed at Grant's Farm. At the very least, defendant is the recipient of a
potential economic benefit. A number of jurisdictions, applying the economic
benefit rule, have held potential economic benefit sufficient to classify the visitor
2
as an invitee. 1
13. Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311
(1867); Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, 24 L.J. 339 (Ex 1856); Parnaby v.
Lancaster Canal Co., 11 Ad. & El. 223 (1839).
14. Davis v. Central Congregational Soc'y., 129 Mass. 367 (1880); Sweeny v.
Old Colony & Newport Railroad Co., 10 Allen 368 (Mass. 1865).
15. 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128 (1892).
16. Armour & Co. v. Rose, 183 Ark. 413, 36 S.W.2d 70 (1931); Popejoy v.
Hannon, 37 Cal. 2d 159, 231 P.2d 481 (1951); Field v. Sisters of Mercy, 126 Colo.
1, 245 P.2d 1167 (1952); ElIguth v. Blackstone Hotel, Inc., 408 Ill. 343, 97 N.E.2d
290 (1951).
17. RESTATMENT, TORTS § 332 (1934).
18. Glaser v. Rothschild, supra note 13, at 3.
19. Ibid.
20. E.g., Argus v. Michler, supra note 8, at 394.
21. E.g., Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72 (1941); Deach v.
Woolner Distilling Co., 187 Ill.
App. 524 (1914).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/14
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In larger perspective, more must be questioned than just the wisdom of the
rule's application. This was not a case of a landowner reluctantly allowing a young
girl to enter upon his premises. Visitors like the plaintiff were encouraged to visit
Grant's Farm. Their presence was desired, expected, even solicited. To hold, under
these circumstances, that plaintiff was a mere licensee is such an unusual result
that the rule which sanctioned it should be questioned.
There are viable alternatives to the economic benefit test. The most widely
accepted is the public invitation test, which was the concept first used to make
the licensee-invitee distinction. One coming upon the land of another by invitation, or by a general invitation extended to the public, is entitled to the protection
of an invitee, even if his visit confers no benefit on the landowner.2 2 The invitation
can be express; or it can be implied where the landowner, by his acts or conduct,
24
23
leads another to believe that the premises are open to the visitor or the public
Some courts,2 5 and the Restatement of Torts, 2d,26 have differentiated between a "public invitee" who is invited upon land as a member of the public,
and "business visitors" who are invited for business purposes of the occupier,
holding that the occupier or landowner owes the duty of reasonable care to both.
Proponents of the public invitation concept contend that it is superior to the
economic benefit test in several respects: (1) It eliminates the dangers inherent
in the subjectiveness of the economic benefit criterion, and particularly the possibility of plaintiff inventing, ex post facto, a "business interest" as his reason for
entering the land; (2) It avoids the illogical process through which some courts,
while using the economic benefit test to produce a desirable result in a particular
case, have gone to extreme lengths to find a benefit to the occupier; and (3) It
tends toward assimilating the tort liability of the landowner with that of other
27
entrepreneurs
A few courts,28 believing that the separate classifications of invitee, licensee,
and trespasser are totally useless, have advocated an elimination of these technical
status positions which tend to insulate the landowning classes from liability to
visitors on the premises. As a substitute, they propose the broad test of reasonable
care under the circumstances. Such a test would subscribe to the "overriding
22. Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942).
23. Robinson v. Leighton, 122 Me. 309, 199 Atl. 809 (1923).
24. Printy v. Reimbold, 200 Iowa 541, 202 N.W. 122 (1925); Ashley v. U.S.,
215 F. Supp. 39 (D. Neb. 1963) (tourist in a national park); Le Rous v. State,
307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E.2d 386 (1954) (visitor to forest preserve).
25. Zaia v. Italia Societa Anonyma di Navigazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87 N.E.2d
183 (1948).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 332 (1966).
27. See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).
See also Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 995, 1000 (1964) for a discussion of these and other

advantages of the public invitation test.
28. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959)
(refusal to apply licensee-invitee distinction to admiralty law); Simmel v. New
Jersey Coop, Co., 47 N.J. Super. 509, 136 A.2d 301 (1957), rev'd on other grounds,
28 N.J. 1, 143 A.2d 521 (1958); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (concurring opinion).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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social view" 20 that where there is forseeable substantial harm, "landowners as well
as others, should use a reasonable duty of care to avoid it."30 A uniform duty of
care for occupiers would end the existing confusion and anachronisms in this area
of laws' by destroying the influences of feudalistic concepts of property rights
which have "resisted the modem law of negligence." 32 If adopted in Missouri, this
concept would probably give rise to many varied interpretations of "reasonable
care," but they would be no more numerous than those currently tolerated in
other areas of Missouri tort law where the "reasonable care" test is applied. The
Missouri Supreme Court, in Wolfson v. Chelist,83 considered the possibility of imposing upon occupiers of land a uniform duty of care toward all those on the
premises by invitation or permission, whether express or implied. While declaring
that the present classification of visitors should not be "so inflexible as to preclude recovery where the facts merit an exception, ' 3 4 the court rejected a uniform
duty of care. It contended that the present classification involves less confusion,
and that it is not always in the "interest of justice" to abandon terminology "long
employed to . . . define legal relations and legal duties imposed."35
Subsequent cases,30 including the principal case, appear to give little effect
to the small measure of flexibility advocated in Wolfson, and portend continued
adherence to the economic benefit-purpose of the visit criterion. Our complex,
urban society no longer demands that those who occupy land be insulated from
the ordinary principles of negligence. The Missouri courts should either broaden
the definition of economic benefit or reject the present test altogether and adopt
in its place either the public invitation theory or a concept of uniform care for
occupiers.
RIcHAIW KINDER

29.
(1956);
30.
31.
630-31.
32.

Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313
see Annot. 62 A.L.R.2d 1211.
Ibid.
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra note 28, at
McCleary, Work of the Supreme Court for 1955, Torts, 21 Mo. L. Rrv.

391 (1956).
33.
34.
35.
36.

284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955).
Id. at 451.
Id. at 452.
E.g., Argus v. Michler, supra note 8, at 394.
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OBSCENITY-VARIABLE CONCEPT
Cinzburg v. United States1

In the leading case of Roth v. United States,2 the Supreme Court declared
obscenity to be outside the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press. The standard for determining whether material was obscene as set forth
by Roth,3 and developed in subsequent cases,4 was reiterated in A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts:5
(a) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) The material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) The material is utterly without
redeeming social value.6
Petitioner Ginzburg was indicted for sending obscene publications and advertisements through the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1461. The publications involved were a magazine, Eros, a bi-weekly newsletter, Liaison, and a book
entitled THE HOUSEWIFE'S HANDBOOK ON SELECTIVE PROMISCUITY [hereinafter cited
as HANDBOOK]. The case was heard without a jury, and the court found the publi-

cations obscene under the Roth test.7 The question presented to the Supreme
Court on certiorari was whether the trial judge had applied the Roth standards
correctly.
The standards of Roth had proved difficult to apply in the obscenity cases
before the Supreme Court from 1957 to 1966.8 The Justices either had been unable
to produce an opinion in which a majority concurred, or had decided the cases
on procedural points or by per curiam order. In these cases, the court regarded
obscenity as an inherent quality, the material being sufficient in itself for the
1. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
2. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. Id. at 484, 489.
4. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
5. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (opinion of Brennan, J.) [hereinafter cited as Fanny
Hill].
6. Id. at 418.
7. United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 338
F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964).
8. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180
(1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684
(1959); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961);
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, supra note 4; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963); Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 4; A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964); Grove
Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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determination. 9 In determining the obscenity issue the Court in Ginzburg considered
the setting in which the publications were presented. The Court assumed without
deciding that apart from such setting the publications were not themselves obscene in the abstract. However, when considered in the setting in which they were
presented, "against a background of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for
the sake of their prurient appeal,"' 0 the publications were obscene.
The Court reached this result after a consideration of evidence that mailing
privileges for the publications and their advertisement were sought from Blue
Ball and Intercourse, Pa., finally being obtained in Middlesex, N.J.;" that the
"leer of the sensualist" permeated the publications' advertisement;12 that slips
were included in the advertisements guaranteeing refund if the books failed to
reach the purchaser due to U.S. Post Office censorship;' 8 and that advertisements
for the HANDBOOK were sent indiscriminately to the public and not limited to a
certain group such as physicians. 14 The author of the HANDBOOK, prior to the
publication rights being acquired by Ginzburg, had printed, advertised, and sold
12,000 copies of the book to medical and psychiatric personnel. The Court distinguished this from the petitioner's conduct. He had proclaimed the book's obscenity;
he "deliberately emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of the work, in order
to catch the salaciously disposed."' 5
Ginzburg marks the end of the determination of obscenity solely on the basis
of the content of the material. The concern of the court is directed to the treatment of the material by the petitioner. The conduct of the defendant becomes of
paramount importance. 1
The foreshadowing of this approach to obscenity can be seen in prior concurring and dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Warren. Concurring in Roth. v.
United States 7 he proclaimed that the central issue was the conduct of the defendant.' 8 In Kingsley Books v. Brown,19 the Chief Justice urged that "the same
object may have wholly different impact depending upon the setting in which it is
placed. . . . It is the manner of use that should determine obscenity. It is the
conduct of the individual that should be judged, not the quality of art or literature." 20 The Chief Justice, with Justice Clark in Jacobellis v. State of Ohio,21
9. Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 1, at 465.
10. Id. at"466.
11. Id. at 467-68.
12. Id. at 468.
13. Id. at 470.
14. Id. at 469-70.
15. Id. at 472.
16. This emphasis upon defendant's conduct is also present in Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). "Appellant was not prosecuted for anything he
said or believed, but for what he did . . . ." Id. at 504.
17. Supra note 2, at 494.
18. Roth v. United States, supra note 2, at 495.
19. 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 446.
21. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 4, at 201 (Warren, C.J., and Clark, J.,
dissenting).
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stated that "the uses to which various material are put-not just the words themselves-must be considered in determining whether or not the materials are
obscene."
The Court cited United States v. RebEkun 22 as persuasive authority for the
decision in Ginzburg. In an opinon by Judge Learned Hand, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld Rebhuhn's conviction for sending obscene matter through
the mail, 23 noting, however, that had the books been directed to persons "likely to
use them for the purpose for which they were written," they could have lawfully
been sent through the mails, but that "the defendants had indiscriminately flooded
the mails with advertisement, plainly designed merely to catch the prurient ....- 24
In Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry25 which held LADY CHATrRLY's LOVER not obscene under the Roth test, the district court commented upon the fact that the
publication's format, advertising, and promotion material treated the book as
serious literature. "There has been no attempt by the publisher to appeal to
prurience or the prurient minded." 26
Justice Brennan insisted that Ginzburg was merely an elaboration of the
Roth standards; 2 7 however, the effect and impact of the decision reaches beyond
this. Its importance is found in the realization that Ginzburg indicates a major
shift in the legal doctrine of obscenity. This is a shift from a concept of constant
obscenity to a concept of variable obscenity.28 The concept of constant obscenity
views obscenity as an inherent quality of the material, remaining the same regardless of time or circumstances. The variable obscenity concept views the question of
obscenity as dependent upon the setting and the conduct of the defendant; a publication might be obscene in one setting and not in another.
The extent to which this concept of variable obscenity will dominate future
obscenity determinations depends upon whether the courts apply the standards
of Rot& first and bring Ginzburg to bear only in a "close case." 29 If this is the
intention of the Court, there arises the question of what is a "close case." In view
of the inability of a majority of the Court to concur in the meaning of Roth, this
question might produce much litigation and appeal.
It is probable, however, that Ginzburg will dominate future obscenity determination. Justice Brennan indicated in Fanny Hill 0 that evidence of exploitation of, or appeal to, prurient interest might justify a different result in that case,
22. 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940).
23. Defendant was convicted of violating Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321,
§ 211, 35 Stat. 1129, as amended, ch. 241, § 2, 36 Stat. 1339 (1911), an early edition of title 18 U.S.C. 1461, which Ginzburg was convicted of violating.
24. United States v. Rebhuhn, suprm note 22, at 514.
25. 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
26. 175 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
27. Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 1, at 475.
28. See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity, The Developing ConstitutionalStandards,45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 68 (1960).
29. Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 1, at 474.
30. Supra note 5. The book, FANNY HILL, was declared not to be obscene
because although two of the Roth requirements had met, the book had "redeeming social importance" and this third requirement meant "utterly without" social
importance. Id. at 419.
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but the Court had been asked only to judge the book in the abstract.3 1 An indication of the future use of Ginzburg is seen in Books, Inc. v. United States,3 2
in which the court of appeals found there was sufficient evidence in the text of a
book, Litst Job, that the three separate tests set forth above33 -were met, and the
book was obscene. The court in dicta said that under Ginzburg, the text of LusT
Jon could be declared obscene because a consideration of the front and back covers
of the paperback justified a conclusion "that there were [sic] pandering and an
exploitation of interest in titillation."3 4
An approach to obscenity based upon a variable concept is more realistic
than one based upon a constant concept. In the area of obscenity, the courts are
called upon to reconcile the rights of persons to freely express themselves under
the First Amendment with the right of the people to maintain a decent society.
Freedom of expression demands the widest possible latitude within this context.
Conviction under a variable concept, as set forth in Ginzburg, would not suppress
a publication for use in a different setting, a setting where there was a "serious
endeavor to advance human knowledge or understanding . . . !,,5 The approach
in Ginzburg should help dispel the "inherent vagueness of Roth," which appears
to be a major concern of the Court.38 A variable obscenity approach would be
helpful in determining the true dominant theme of the material and its true social
value despite attempts to disguise them.37 The dominant theme of the material
under a variable approach would vary according to the material's primary audience, but the material would still be considered as a whole.38
Extended to its logical conclusion, the Court's opinion in Ginzburg, with its
emphasis upon the setting and the defendant's conduct, raises the question whether
a publication might be declared obscene without any consideration of the text. In
Ginzburg, the Court mentioned the content of the publications,3 9 as it did briefly
in Misrhkin v. New York. 40 The ultimate limiting factor would be whether or not
a "close case" must be established under Roth before Ginzburg is brought into play.
The legal problem of obscenity is difficult to resolve due to definitional difficulties surrounding the word itself and to the need to protect freedom of expression. Ginzburg, by adopting a variable concept of obscenity, has placed the pressure upon the panderer and the purveyor. This approach gives the widest possible
latitude to persons honestly attempting to express themselves.
HUGH MCPHEETERS, JR.

31, Justice Brennan noted that such evidence would not dispense with the
requirement that the item be "utterly" without social value; but as elaborated in
Ginzburg, where "the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evaluation at its face value."

Id. at 420.
32. 358 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1966).
33. Text accompanying note 6.
34. Books, Inc. v. United States, supra note 32, at 938.
35. Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 1, at 475.
36. Id. at 475, n. 19.
37. Id. at 470.
38. Mishkin v. New York, supra note 16, at 508.
39. Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 1, at 466-67.
40. Supra note 16, at 505.
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PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEI-CONCLUSIVE EFFECT OF A
DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER
Sheen v. DiBellal
Plaintiff was injured while cutting a tree for defendant, and filed a negligence
action in the circuit court. Defendant was represented by his liability insurer,
but his workmen's compensation insurer was not notified. The parties stipulated
that defendant was a qualified employer under the Workmen's Compensation
Act,2 and if plaintiff was defendant's employee when injured, his exclusive
remedy was under the Act. There was no stipulation that plaintiff was an employee at the time of injury. The judge concluded that plaintiff was defendant's
employee within the meaning of the Act, and plaintiff's only remedy was Workmen's Compensation. The judge then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Later, plaintiff accepted two thousand dollars for agreeing not to appeal.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission where
he contended that his Workmen's Compensation coverage had been determined
in the prior suit and all that remained was the calculation of his award. The
referee rejected the argument, found that plaintiff was not an employee within
the meaning of the Act, and denied compensation. This finding was affirmed by
the full commission and the circuit court.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's contention
that the judgment in the circuit court was conclusive on the issue of his status
as a covered employee and holding that the circuit court had no jurisdiction
to decide the issue. The court of appeals held that the Industrial Commission
was the exclusive body to determine the issue of Workmen's Compensation
coverage and when a question as to the applicability of the act is raised in the
circuit court, the proper procedure is to submit it to the Industrial Commission
for determination. 3 The court also held that the circuit court judgment was not
res judicata because it was only a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and not a judgment on the merits; that except for his settlement,
plaintiff could still bring an action for common law negligence against defendant.
The court may have felt that the first suit was an improper attempt by the
liability insurer to shift liability to the compensation insurer who was not even
aware of the suit. The court may have reached its decision in order to avoid this
result.
"In all cases cognizable by the Compensation Commission its jurisdiction is
exclusive," 4 and the Industrial Commission may decide whether the Act is appli1. 395 S.W.2d 296 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Ch. 287, RSMo 1959.
3. Sheen v. DiBella, supra note 1, at 303.
4. Kemper v. Gluck, 327 Mo. 733, 738, 39 S.W.2d 330, 332 (1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 649 (1931). See also, § 287.120(2), RSMo 1959; Anderson v.
Benson Mfg. Co., 338 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1960); Gardner v. Stout, 347 Mo. 1206,
119 S.W.2d 790 (1938); Musielak v. Int'l Shoe Co., 387 S.W.2d 217 (St. L. Mo.
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cable and make a binding judgment on that basis.5 This means that the Industrial
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to make an award for an accident arising
under the Act. But in practice, it has not been construed to mean that the
Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine coverage. On the
contrary, courts do decide questions of the applicability of the Act where necessary to the disposition of the case. 6 No Missouri case suggests the referral pro7
cedure outlined by the court.
Of greater significance, the court in Sheen s did not adequately consider the
differences between res judicata and collateral estoppel. The holding that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a judgment on the
merits and therefore not res judicata 9 is irrelevant to the question of whether
conclusive effect will be given the prior determination of Workmen's Compensation coverage. When res judicata is applied a second suit may not be maintained
between the parties because there has been a prior judgment on the merits. The
cause of action is extinguished. Collateral estoppel only binds parties to a former
suit on the issue litigated, determined by the court and necessary to the judgment. 0 Issues so determined in one suit are binding between the same parties
App. 1965); Duncan v. Thompson, 146 S.W.2d 112 (Spr. Mo. App. 1940) rev'd
on other grounds, 315 U.S. 1 (1942); Cleveland v. Laclede-Christy Clay Prods.
Co., 113 S.W.2d 1065 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938); Pfitzinger v. Shell Pipe Line Corp.,
226 Mo. App. 861, 46 S.W.2d 955 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932).
5. Liechty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 162 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. 1942); Pfitzinger v. Shell Pipe Line Co., supra note 4; State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co.
v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W.2d 897 (1928).
6. There is one group of cases where the Act was held inapplicable by the
circuit court and judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. Nussbaum v. Kansas City
Stock Yards Co. of Me., 359 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1962); McDaniel v. Kerr, 364 Mo.
1, 258 S.W.2d 629 (1953) (judgment for plaintiff had been set aside by trial
judge and was reversed on appeal); State en re. St. Louis Car Co. v. Hostetter,
345 Mo. 102, 131 S.W.2d 558 (1939); Cleveland v. Laclede-Christy Clay Prods.
Co., supra note 4; Kearly v. St. Louis Car Co., 111 S.W.2d 976 (St. L. Mo. App.
1938). Another group reversed judgment for plaintiff on finding the Act applicable. Kirch v. Sheffield Steel Div., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd,
274 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1960); Musielak v. Int'l Shoe Co., supra note 4; Anderson
v. Benson Mfg. Co., supra note 4; Gardner v. Stout, supra note 4; Kemper v.
Gluck, supra note 4. In neither group of cases was the Industrial Commission
given any opportunity to determine coverage.
7. Subsequent to Sheen, supra note 1, in Lamar v. Ford Motor Co., 409
S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1966), the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected such an approach. The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" was found to be an administrative
device limited to situations involving "administrative expertise, technical factual
situations and regulatory systems in which uniformity of administration is essential." Id. at 107, e.g., Public Service Commission. The court held "that the circuit court has jurisdiction to determine upon proper presentation of the issue
whether plaintiff was an employee of defendant Ford." Ibid.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Although it is recognized that courts will often use res judicata in a
broad sense which will include collateral estoppel, it is apparent from the discussion by the court that this was not meant here.
10. Raterman v. Raterman Realty & Inv. Co., 341 S.W.2d 280, (St. L. Mo.
App. 1960); RESTATEMErr, JuDGMENTS §§ 45(c), comments c & d, 68 (1942);
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.9 (1965).
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whether they arise in the same or a different cause of action. Only a final judgment is required and it need not be on the merits. 11
To apply collateral estoppel, the court must also have jurisdiction to decide the issue. "It is the generally accepted rule that courts have the authority
in the first instance to pass on the vital issue as to whether or not it is a court
of competent jurisdiction to pass on the subject matter and adjudge the parties;"'12
that "principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to
other issues." 13 The rule is not "less applicable to a decision denying jurisdiction
than one maintaining it." 14 Thus, a finding of lack of jurisdiction is conclusive
between the parties to the action in which the issue was raised.' 5 They may not
thereafter bring an action in the same court unless the jurisdictional defect has
been corrected.
However, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction by one court will not preclude
suit in a court that does have jurisdiction. 16 If questions are raised in this second
suit that were necessarily decided by the prior dismissal as material to juris7
diction, collateral estoppel will apply to prevent their relitigation.'
"As a general proposition, a judgment for defendant based on lack of jurisdiction does not operate as an estoppel precluding the subsequent litigation of questions material to the merits."' 8 However, the weight of authority holds that
"where a question of fact material to the merits has been decided by and is es-

sential to a judgment for defendant based on lack of jurisdiction, such determination is conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent action either for the same
or a different cause of action."' 19

11. Linton v. Perry Knitting Co., 295 N.Y. 14, 17, 64 N.E.2d 270, 271
(1945); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45(c), comments c & d (1942).
12. Stucker v. County of Muscatine, 249 Iowa 485, 495, 87 N.W.2d 452, 458
(1958).
13. McCarthy v. State, 1 Utah2d 205, 207, 265 P.2d 387, 389 (1953), quoting
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932).
14. Ripperberger v. A.C. Allyn & Co., 113 F.2d 332, 333 (2d Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940).
15. Kipbea Baking Co. v. Straus, 218 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Healy
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 287 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1956) (conclusive
as to the fact that the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court would be an undue burden on interstate commerce); Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp. of N.J.,
238 Mo. App. 647, 186 S.W.2d 51 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945); Ripperberger v. A.C.
Allyn & Co., supra note 14; 30A AM. JUR. Judgments § 353 (1958), 50 CJ.S.
Judgments § 638 (1947); see Annot. 49 A.L.R.2d 1036, 1052 (1953).
16. Richter v. Frieden, 243 S.W.2d 783 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); Motley v.
Dugan, 191 S.W.2d 979 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945); 30A AM. JuR. Judgments § 353
(1958); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 638 (1947); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942);
2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 733 (1925).
17. Mellen v. Hirsch, 8 F.R.D. 250 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 171 F.2d 127 (4th
Cir. 1948); Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp. of N.J., supra note 15; 30A AM.
JUR. Judgments § 353 (1958); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49, comment b (1942);
see Annot. 49 A.L.R.2d 1036, 1052 (1953).
18. 49 A.L.R.2d 1036, 1061 (1953); see also Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v.
Great Southern Ins. Co., 330 Mo. 988, 52 S.W.2d 1 (1932).
19. 49 A.L.R.2d 1036, 1068 (1953); Stucker v. County of Muscatine, supra
note 10. There is dicta to the contrary in Williams v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,
14 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1953) and Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. Cal.
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In McCarthy v. State,20 plaintiff brought an action against a park commission and certain individuals in federal court. The case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter because the state of Utah was actually the
real party in interest. Subsequently, suit was brought in state court which held
that the prior determination that plaintiff's suit was against the state could
not be relitigated.
A similar result was reached in Shore v. Shore,21 where the court in the
first action annulled a marriage but refused to order a division of the community
property because the parties were in pari delicto,2 2 and the court had no jurisdiction to divide the property in such cases. In a later suit for partition, the property was divided, but this was reversed by the Supreme Court of California because the first suit conclusively determined the issue of in pari delicto, and it
could not be relitigated.
Rivers v. Norfolk, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Iw. 2 3 reached the same result. Plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries but the suit was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff's remedy was under the Longshoreman's
and Harbor Worker's Act. Later, plaintiff brought suit in federal court under
the Jones Act alleging that he was a seaman. Summary judgment was granted
defendant because the prior dismissal necessarily determined that plaintiff was a
longshoreman and not a seaman.
In most cases, giving conclusive effect to the issue determined in the first
suit only prevents its relitigation in the second suit. If this issue is the only
ground on which the second suit is based, it may not be maintained. Although
the effect is similar, collateral estoppel is being applied, not res judicata.
The court in the Sheen case gave considerable weight to the fact that there
was no specific finding of any of the other elements required for application of the
Act, e.g., course of employment and type of employee. Again, this is irrelevant
because the parties had stipulated that the Act would apply if plaintiff were an
employee when injured. This was the only issue before the circuit court, and a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter necessarily had to be
based on a finding that plaintiff was an employee.
Application of the prevailing rules of collateral estoppel requires that this
finding be given conclusive effect in the hearing before the Industrial Commission. There is no reason why defendant should be permitted to contend plaintiff was a covered employee in one action and not a covered employee in another.
Since the question whether plaintiff was an employee was the only contested
1953), both holding such facts to be "incidentaF' to the dismissal. This was based
on RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942), but the comments to that section make
it clear that it only refers to a question that was incidentally determined in making a judgment on the merits and not a question necessarily decided in connection
with a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
20. Supra note 13.
21. 43 Cal.2d 627, 277 P.2d 4 (1954).
22. "In equal fault; equally culpable or criminal, in a case of equal fault or
guilt." BLACK, LAw DicnoNtAy (4th ed. 1951).
23. 210 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Va. 1962).
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issue in the Industrial Commission hearing, this would have the effect of being
determinative of the rights of the parties in this situation. The only issue remaining would be the computation of the amount of the award.
In addition, plaintiff could not return to the circuit court, even if he had
24
not settled, because the finding of lack of jurisdiction is conclusive.
While the result may be supportable on some other basis, it cannot be supported on the grounds given by the court. It should be concluded that the prevailing rule of law requires that questions determined as necessary for a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter be given conclusive effect in a
later suit. A holding to the contrary, as in this case, should not be followed. To
do so would undermine the whole area of collateral estoppel.
JAMES T. NEwsoM

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: NEW VITALITY FOR SECTION 1963
Stanford v. Utley'
On November 20, 1952, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking monetary damages
for the wrongful death of his wife and for injuries sustained by him. The plaintiff
had been involved in a collision with defendant's truck. Jurisdiction was based
upon diversity of citizenship and the matter in dispute was over ten thousand
dollars. The defendant answered and the suit lay virtually dormant for three
years. On July 23, 1955, the defendant advised the plaintiff that no objection
would be raised to plaintiff's taking a default judgment.2 The plaintiff made the
appropriate motion and on April 25, 1956, the court entered a one hundred
thousand dollar judgment for the plaintiff. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff
registered this judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 1963,3
by filing a certified copy of the judgment. On August 6, 1963, plaintiff filed notice
to take the defendant's deposition to discover assets as provided for by FED. R.
24. Sutpra note 15.
1. 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965).
2. Apparently defendant had no objection to a default judgment because he
had divested himself of assets in Mississippi.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958), the pertinent part of which reads:
A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property now or
hereafter entered in any district court which has become final by appeal
or expiration of time for appeal may be registered in any other district by
filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. A judgment so registered
shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the
district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.
The court of appeals disposed of the necessity of registering a final judgment on
the basis that one who consents to a judgment has no standing to appeal. 341
F.2d at 272.
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Cxv. P. 69, 26, and 30.4 The defendant moved to quash the notice on the sole
ground that the district court in Missouri had no power to enforce a dead judgment as the original judgment was now barred in Mississippi by her seven year
statute of limitations.5
The trial court was confronted directly with the issue of whether the registration created a "Missouri judgment" insofar as the statute of limitations applicable
to the case was concerned. After appropriate hearings, the motion to quash was
sustained. The court reasoned 6 that it was obliged to give effect to the law
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co. 7 In diversity cases, such as this, when deciding conflict of laws, the district
court must apply the law of the forum. Hence the court felt compelled to apply
Missouri's borrowing statute8 which bars action in the state courts where the
statute of limitations of the forum in which the cause of action arose would
bar the cause of action 9 The court rejected plaintiff's contention that section 1963 created a Missouri judgment so that Missouri's statute of limitation
would apply. Instead the court found that the section was purely ministerial and
conferred only limited powers upon the court of registration to utilize the forum's
laws of execution to enforce the judgment.
This holding was reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 0
We feel that registration provides, so far as enforcement is concerned, the
equivalent of a new judgment of the registration court."
The court of appeals held that in order to give proper effect to the words "same
force and effect" the result of registration under section 1963 must be the
equivalent of a new judgment. To hold otherwise would render this remedy strictly
inferior to the traditional judgment on a judgment. Confining itself to the facts
of the case before it, the court concluded that the effect of registration was to give
plaintiff a Missouri judgment to which Missouri would apply her ten year statute
of limitations.' 2 Plaintiff had until April 26, 1966, to enforce his Missouri judgment.
An important question remains unanswered by the court of appeal's opinion:
Does the decision create a conflict between section 1963 and the Erie-Guaranty
4. Record, p. 3, Stanford v. Utley, supra note 1.
5. Record, p. 5, Stanford v. Utley, supra note 1. The Mississippi

statute

of limitations in question was Miss. CODE § 733 (1942).

6. The trial court filed a memorandum opinion. Record, pp. 6-10, Stanford
v. Utley, srpra note 1.
7. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
8. § 516.180, RSMo 1959, which reads:
Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state,
territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete
defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of this state.
9. The relevance of this statute to the problem before the court in the instant case is critical, in view of the merger of the original cause of action into the
original judgment.
10. Stanford v. Utley, supra note 1.
11. 341 F.2d at 268.
12. § 516.350, RSMo 1959.
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Trust-Klaxon'3 policy of equal administration of justice in the state and federal
court systems? Under the borrowing statute' 4 any attempt to enforce the Missis-

sippi judgment in the Missouri court system after April 25, 1963, by means of a
suit on the judgment would have failed. Also an attempt to enforce it under the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law15 would not have been success-

ful. Although there are no Missouri decisions on the latter point, the Illinois Supreme Court in Ligkt v. Lighkt' 6 announced that the validity of the judgment
sought to be registered was to be determined as of the date of the registration.
Therefore, any attempt to register after April 25, 1963, would have constituted an
attempt to register a dead judgment and would not have been allowed. An attempt to register the judgment under section 1963 would also have been as futile
as an attempt to register a dead judgment.17 If the plaintiff had been allowed to
register initially at this date, there would be a clear violation of the Erie policy.
The basic policy set forth in Erie and Guaranty Trust, and carried out in
Klaxon was that a federal court could not provide a remedy, nor grant relief, if
the right to such was unavailable in the state court within whose boundaries the
federal court sat. Further, federal courts are to adhere to certain state procedural
rules where the substantive rights of the parties would be affected.' 8 In this case,
aside from section 1963, there was no right to enforce the judgment in the Missouri courts after April 25, 1963. In that this decision allowed plaintiff to enforce
his judgment within the territorial boundaries of Missouri, it altered the parties'
substantive rights. However, outcome is not the only relevant test in diversity
action. 19 The real purpose of the Erie decision was twofold: first, to prevent forum
shopping that could give a party a decided advantage; second, to avoid inequality
in the administration of justice in the concurrent areas of state and federal civil
jurisdiction. The outcome test must be considered as it relates to these aims.
In the instant case, there is no indication that the plaintiff chose the federal
court system in order to gain any undue advantage. At the time he registered his
judgment, April 26, 1956, he had two additional alternatives available to him; the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law and the common law method of

bringing suit on his original judgment 20 Had plaintiff employed either of these
methods at the onset, he would have acquired a new Missouri judgment in his
favor and the appropriate Missouri statute of limitations would then apply to that
judgment. Although there are no Missouri decisions directly on this point, Mangold
13. Kaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., supra note 7; Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-59 (1st ed. 1963).
14. Supra note 8.

15. § 511.760, RSMo 1959; 9A UNIFoRM
16. 12 Ill. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957).

LAWS ANN.

474 (1965).

17. See Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's and Ware-

housemen's Union, 128 F. Supp. 697, 701 (D. Hawaii 1955); Fowler v. Pilson, 123

F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
18. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, suspra note 13; WRIGHT, Op. cit.
supra note 13, at § 56.
19. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
20. § 511.760(16), RSMo 1959; e.g., Hoffman v. Hart, 309 S.W.2d 709 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1958).
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v. Mangold2 lends credence to this view so far as section 511.760, RSMo 1959 is
concerned:

That judgment is now the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County,
Missouri, as fully as though it had been rendered by said court in a proceeding originating in that court ....
Presumedly, this statement would be equally applicable to the statute of limitations
question before the court under this act. It is assumed that the Missouri courts
would apply the law of Missouri to a judgment rendered in Missouri, even though
that judgment be based on an original judgment of a sister state given credence
under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.m22 Therefore, as of November 20, 1952, the choice of forum created no perceivable difference
in outcome. The relevance of November 20, 1952, as the reference point is seen
23
in the case of Hanna v. Plumer:
Through choice of the federal or state rule will at tids point have a marked
effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two
rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of forum. Petitioner,
in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence to the
state rule would have resulted only in altering the way in which process
was served.
This clearly applies to the facts in the instant case.24 At the relevant time,
the use of the state methods of recovery would not have resulted in a total bar
to recovery. The choice of forum had no relevance at the time of making the
choice. Nor does this decision encourage forum shopping since the same result is
available in the Missouri court system. If the court of appeals had affirmed the
judgment of the district court, it would have been penalizing the plaintiff for
choosing the federal forum and procedure; for as noted, he could have resorted
to Missouri's methods of enforcing a judgment of a sister state on April 26, 1956,
and thus have obtained the benefit of the ten year statute of limitation. To
penalize the plaintiff for his choice would have been entirely inconsistent with the
second principle of equal adminstration. Although the two methods allowed by
Missouri may be more expensive and time consuming, they would allow a consistent result. The court of appeals was entirely correct in holding that the Klaxon
doctrine was inapplicable, and this decision is not in conflict with the Erie policy.
At common law, foreign judgments were enforced by the judgment creditor
suing on the original judgment which was accorded credence under the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution. 25 This action was necessary since the original
cause of action was merged into the original judgment; and in early decisions, the
21. 294 S.W.2d 368, 369 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956).
22. U.S. CONST. art. 4 § 1. See Stanford v. Utiey, supra note 1, at 268. No
Missouri cases in point can be found.
23. 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965) (Emphasis added).
24. Stanford v. Utley, supra note 1.
25. See generally, 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 433.1 (1935); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICTS § 434, Comment (a) (1934); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45 (1942).
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United States Supreme Court refused to extend sufficient power to the full faith
and credit clause to allow extra-territorial enforcement.26 Under this cumbersome
formula, the judgment creditor was required to expend additional funds, and was
subject to the contingency of extensive delay. The delay factor also opened the
possibility that the debtor would squander all his assets, depriving the creditor
of effective relief. Under the federal system, there were additional barriers to a
fair administration of justice. If the original jurisdiction was based on the federal
question theory, the plaintiff would be forced to establish diversity in a subsequent
action, as well as proper venue and dollar amount. The second action on a federal
judgment was not a federal question. Neither did diversity carry over, and the
plaintiff was again confronted with problems of diversity and venue, and the jurisdictional amount. 27 Logically, the federal judgment creditor was in too many cases
precluded from the federal forum.
The need for a comprehensive system of enforcement was realized as early as
1787 in the United States 28 and in the English Commonwealth a system did emerge
with the passage of time.29 The cry for reform in America continued 30 and in 1948
26. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 169 (1839); Lamb v. Powder
River Live Stock Co., 132 Fed. 434 (8th Cir. 1904). For a general discussion of this
proposition see, Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Fall Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YALE L. J. 421 (1919); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1935).
27. MOORE, JUDICIAL CODE COMMENTARY 0.03(4), p. 384 (1949) and cases
cited therein.
28. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison proposed a
uniform system for the enforcement of foreign judgments among the states and
the federal courts, based upon registration. Madison relied on the power granted
to Congress under the full faith and credit clause and the commerce clause. See,
2 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 448 (1911).
29. Beginning in 1801, the English Parliament began what was to become a
uniform registration system for the enforcement of judgments within England and
the Commonwealth. England Crown Debt Act, 1801, 41 Geo. 3, c. 90. The success
of this venture prompted Parliament to continue to expand the registration system
with the Judgment Extension Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54; and then the Inferior
Court Judgment Extension Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 31; and finally to the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81. Registration of an original
judgment under this system created the equivalent of a judgment of the court of
registration for the purpose of enforcement only as it related to the use of the
process of execution. Because execution is the normal method of enforcement, as
a practical matter the system was complete, avoiding for the most part the difficulties of the common law system while preserving to the defendant his traditional
defenses. For a good discussion of the English system and its relation to American
law, see Yntema, supra note 26 and note, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 971 (1950).
30. After Madison, supra note 28, the next significant proposal came in 1919
when Professor Cook proposed a uniform system of enforcement of judgments in
both state and federal courts. See, Cook, supra note 26. This proposal included a
provision whereby the statute of limitations of the forum rendering judgment
would be controlling. Cook, supra note 26, at 438. In 1927 the Standing Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the A.B.A. presented a plan in which registration was the hub. See, 52 A.B.A. REP. 292, 319 (1927). The next significant step
came from the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the FED. R. Civ. P. See,
Revisor's note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963. The Committee submitted Rule 77 for the
court's approval, the text of that rule being substantially that of the adopted section. It is unknown why the Supreme Court rejected this rule, but Professor
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Congress finally responded with the passage of the present section 1963. Significantly, this same year saw the approval of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
31
Laws.
What did Congress intend this enactment to accomplish? Legislative history
affords little guidance. 32 By judicial convention, Congress is aware of Supreme
Court decisions affecting the area in which they are legislating, and so Congress
was aware of M'Elmoyle v. Cohen.33 Given this decision, Congress must have intended to exercise its constitutional powers to create a substitute for the outmoded
common law procedure. It must have been intended as reform. 34 To suppose a
different intent is to presume that Congress established a remedy inferior to the
common law judgment on a judgment, and such a presumption cannot be given
credit, Referring to this possibility the court of appeals in Stanford stated:
If for enforcement purposes, registration were to be given a lesser status
than a judgment on a judgment, some or all of these purposes are thwarted
and the judgment creditor, in order fully to protect himself, must resort

to the old and more formal procedure.35

Section 1963 provides that registration is to "have the same effect as a judgment."
"These are plain words and mean what they say. Congress did not intend any
different meaning. '30 If this is what Congress meant, Stanford37 carried that in-

Moore speculates that the court felt compelled to do so under the Rides Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958), in that the proposed rule "abridged, enlarged, or
modified" substantive rights. See, 2 MooRE , FEDERAL PRAncE 1.04(2) pp. 213-15
(2d ed. 1965); 1 BARRON & HoLWZOFF (Wright ed.) § 5, pp. 20-21 (1960). In 1948

Congress adopted the present section 1963. Perhaps Congress did what the court
felt that it could not do. In that same year, the A.L.I. approved the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 474 (1965). The
reader should compare section 1963 with the uniform law, taking into consideration
the fact that the uniform law is really a summary judgment procedure in which
registration is relegated to an unimportant role, whereas section 1963 comes more
directly to the problems heretofore outlined. For a cynical comment on the passage
of § 1963, Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of
Laws, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 881, 890 (1950). For general discussion of federal registration see, e.g., Sedler, Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Decrees, 28 Mo. L.
REv. 432 (1963); note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42 IowA L. REv. 285
(1957); note, New Federal Judgment Enforcement Procedure, 50 COLUM. L. REv.
971 (1950); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, § 61 (1962); 50 C.J.S. § 888-903, pp.
468-540.
31. See note 15 and note 30, supra.
32. 341 F.2d at 268. See generally, S. REP. No. 1917, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
33. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 169 (1839). This decision holds that a judgment of a
sister state was a record of debt, not examinable on the merits and that to give it
force, it must be made a judgment of the sister state in which enforcement is
sought. The Supreme Court refused to sanction extra-territorial enforcement on
the basis of the full faith and credit clause.
34. It should be noted that the enactment of § 1963 was part of the general
revision of the judicial code.
35. 341 F.2d at 270.
36. Juneau Spruce Corp. v. Intl. Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union, 128 F. Supp. 715, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
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tention to fruition. Authority relating to this crucial problem of intention embodied in section 1963 is scant. Relevant decisions began only in 1951. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Gullet 'u. Gullet initially stated:
Registration of the District of Columbia judgment in Florida is purely a
ministerial step in its enforcement.
It confers upon the Florida court no
38
power over the judgment itself.
But the court hedged this opinion later:
There was no error in refusing to do so (quash registration) in this instance, however, because the underlying judgment, standing duly registered
and unsatisfied in the Florida district, has the same effect as a judgment
of that court. ...
In 1955, a judgment creditor attempted to use section 1963 to register his Alaskan
judgment in two separate district courts. In the first of these attempts, the
Hawaiian District Court stated:
28 U.S.C. § 1963 does not give a new judgment to the judgment creditor.
Registration
is purely a ministerial act in the enforcement of a foreign
40
judgment.
In the companion case, the District Court for the Northern District of California
felt otherwise, finding that the plaintiff obtained "in effect a judgment of our
Court." 41 In these cases, the Alaskan statute of limitation had not yet run.
However, a different statute prevented enforcement (in Alaska) by means of execution. Both courts allowed the registration, holding that the judgment creditor could
register the judgment on which the statute of limitation had not run since FED. R.
Civ. P. 69 and Miller v. United States42 required that the court apply the execution
laws of its forum and that therefore, the Alaskan law on this point had no relevance.
Because the Hawaii court reached this result, one can explain its statement as to
the purely ministerial qualities of section 1963 to refer only to the actual mechanical process of registering and not to refer to the section's ultimate effect.
37. Stanford v. Utley, supra note 1.
38. 188 F.2d 719, 720 (5th Cir. 1951). In 1941, plaintiff obtained a decree
of separate maintenance from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. In 1947, that court made the decree permanent. This judgment became final by appeal. Plaintiff then registered the judgment in Florida pursuant to
section 1963. Defendant moved to quash registration and to quash garnishment.
The district court overruled the motions and the court of appeals sustained that
ruling, finding that the judgment was one for the recovery of money within the
meaning of the section.
39. Id. at 721.
40. 128 F. Supp. at 699. In these two cases, plaintiff had obtained a judgment
against the Union in Alaska. Under the law of Alaska that judgment was still
valid, but could not be enforced by execution. Therefore the issue was whether the
Alaska judgment qualified for registration.
41. Juneau Spruce Corp. v. Intl. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,
128 F. Supp. 715, 717.
42. 160 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1947).
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1958 witnessed a significant step in the progression when the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co.:
The legislative history of this section clearly indicates that the registration statute is intended to provide all the benefits deriving from a local
judgment on a "foreign" judgment without subjecting
either plaintiff or
43
defendant to the expense of a second lawsuit.

Finally, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon added support.
The plaintiff here holds a judgment in the District Court of Oregon by
transfer .

. .

. Plaintiff overlooks the fact that she is not attempting to

here enforce a judgment of the District Court of Arkansas and that this
court is duty bound to recognize the substantive law of the State of Oregon in dealing with its judgment in these proceedings."
The bulk of this authority, though scant, lends support to the proposition that
Congress intended to simplify the enforcement of foreign judgments by eliminating
jurisdictional problems, as well as those of venue, time and expense, by providing
the federal judgment creditor with a streamlined procedure which gave the respective
parties the equivalent of the remedies available to them in state courts. Uniformly, judgment debtors in challenges to registration have been allowed to assert
their traditional defenses by way of collateral attack, albeit in new forms such as
a motion to quash registration; motion to quash notice; motion to quash execution; and motion to quash garnishment. These defenses are not spelled out as
available in Section 1963, but have been permitted. Under the idea of mutuality
of remedy utilized by equity courts, the judgment creditor should also have the
equivalent remedy available to him, specifically the equivalent to a new judgment.
If the registration has withstood the tests of collateral attack, it should be given
comparable validity in its enforcement. This notion corresponds precisely to that
of the English registration system. The equivalent judgment is provided by registration while the traditional defenses are allowed 4 5 Although there are no English
decisions on the precise issue presented in Stanford,46 a contrary decision there
would be in sharp contrast to that system's express purpose.
Assuming that the above cases have established congressional intention, the
Stanford47 decision brings it to complete fruition. If other courts of appeal show
the same concern for logic and practicality, a uniform system for the enforcement
43. 261 F.2d 29, 30 (5th Cir. 1958).
* 44. Ezell v. Equity General Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 51, 52 (D. Ore. 1962)
(emphasis added). In this case, plaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant
insurance company in 1961 in the United States District Court for the District
of Arkansas. She registered this judgment in the District of Oregon and attempted
to enforce it by a writ of execution and garnishment. Under the law of Arkansas
such action against an insolvent insurance company is permissible. Under the law
of Oregon, one cannot execute on assets of an insolvent company held in ancillary
receivership. The court of appeals held that the applicable law was that of Oregon
and denied the use of execution to the plaintiff.
45. See generally, supra note 29.
46. Stanford v. Utley, supra note 1.
47. Ibid.
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of federal money and property judgments will have been established, free from
the problems which have plagued judgment creditors for nearly two hundred years.
A system of enforcement with traditional safeguards preserved to the defendants,
has been greatly advanced. In the future course of section 1963 new problems
under the new judgment for enforcement principle will arise. Courts will be called
-upon to decide whether one may register a registered judgment elsewhere; whether
a registered judgment is entitled to full faith and credit; how one revives a registered
judgment; and whether the court of registration has the power to correct registered
judgments. 48 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly limited its decision to
the fact situation before it.
We do not now go so far as to say that registration effects a new judgment in the registration court for every conceivable purpose; neither do
we say that it fails to do so for any particular purpose. 49
Nevertheless, this decision must have far-reaching consequences, in that it has
provided a logical and practical principle on which later decisions can be based.
JoHN L. OLIVER, JR.

TRADE REGULATION-THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PER SE RULE
AGAINST CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL
United States v. General Motors'
This was a civil action brought by the United States to enjoin defendant
manufacturer and three defendant dealer associations 2 from participating in an
alleged conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 The issue was
the extent which General Motors and the dealer associations could coerce individual dealers and dictate to whom they could sell their product. The government previously had proceeded criminally against the same defendants and a
verdict had been directed for the defendants. 4 The trial court in this companion
48. See, James Blackstone Memorial Assn. v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co.,
28 F.R.D. 385 (D. Conn. 1961).
49. 341 F.2d at 271.
1. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
2. Losor Chevrolet Dealers Association; Dealer's Service, Inc.; and Foothill
Chevrolet Dealers Association. Also named in the complaint were various managers
and officers.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) which provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is dedaed to be illegal .... Every person who

shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared
by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
4. United States v. General Motors, 216 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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civil case also dismissed the government's complair~t. The case came to the
Supreme Court by direct appeal; 6 held, reversed and remanded.
By the fall of 1960, complaints had begun to reach General Motors that
certain dealers in the Los Angeles area were selling new Chevrolets through discount houses, referral services, and other merchandising schemes involving third
parties. Other dealers, both individually and through their dealer associations, endeavored to persuade General Motors to eliminate these practices. By means of
f'policy letters" and unprecedented individual confrontations by the regional
manager, the manufacturer urged each dealer in the area to cease dealing with the
discounters. To encourage compliance, private investigators were hired to attempt to purchase Chevrolets through discounters. The investigators turned over
the cars and all pertinent information to the zone manager who summoned the
offending dealer and gave him the "opportunity" to repurchase the car, often at a
substantial loss. By the spring of 1961, the campaign to eliminate the discounters
was a complete success.
At trial, the government contended that General Motors' actions, in concert with the activities of certain dealers and the dealer associations, were directed at price control and constituted a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court found no conspiracy, but instead held that the activities of the alleged conspirators were parallel in seeking legitimate ends. 7 The
court saw no indication that General Motors was attempting to control prices,8
and concluded that the exclusion of the discount houses was in no way an unreasonable restraint of trade. 10
The Supreme Court found: 1'
a classic conspiracy in restraint of
dealers, the defendant associations,
class of competitors by terminating
a minority of Chevrolet dealers and
freedom to deal through discounters

trade: joint, collaborative action by
and General Motors to eliminate a
business dealings between them and
to deprive franchised dealers of their
if they so choose.

The Court reasoned that this was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The
significance of the per se finding is that the unreasonableness of the restraint is
conclusively presumed.
The significance of this case can best be understood as a link in a long chain
of cases dealing with attempts by manufacturers to control their product from the
time it is produced until it reaches the consumer. The manufacturer may use
5. United States v. General Motors, 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
6. Under the Expediting Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
7. Supra note 5, at 88-89.
8. Id. at 88.
9. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, supra note 3, has been construed by the
Court "as precluding only those contracts or combinations which 'unreasonably'
restrain competition." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). This is the much
celebrated "rule of reason."
10. Supra note 5, at 88.
11. Supra note 1, at 140.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/14
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independent judgment in choosing the dealers, or particular class of dealers, to
whom he will sell.'2 He may unilaterally refuse to deal with those who do not
adhere to fixed retail prices. 13 However, the manufacturer must not attempt to
maintain prices by express' 4 or implied 15 contracts. Furthermore, the refusal to
deal must be direct and cannot be achieved with assistance from wholesalers. 16
In the instant case, the Court found "a fabric interwoven by many strands
of joint action to eliminate the discounters from access to the market."' 7 Joint
efforts which eliminate a trader from the market constitute a per se violation
of the Sherman Act.' 8 Economic motivations for such acts are immaterial, and it
is not necessary to consider the individual legality of the various defendants'
actions. 19

The opinion carefully states that the Court expresses no view concerning the
"location clause" in General Motors' Dealer Franchise Agreements; 20 that is,
whether this clause can be construed to prohibit the individual dealer from selling
to or through a discounter. Such a contract, so construed, 2 ' might be considered
22
in restraint of trade

12. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
The case which established this elusive principle was United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), where the Court found no violation of the Sherman
Act in the manufacturer's conduct of distributing lists of resale prices and stating
that there would be no deliveries to non-complying dealers, demanding information about non-complying dealers from the wholesalers, eliciting promises of
future compliance from offending dealers, and resuming sales only with dealers
who gave these requested promises. See generally KINTNER, AN AimmusT
PRIMER 27-30, 38-42, 47-58 (1964).

13. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
14. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
15. ."Whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement or
by acquiescence of the wholesalers . . . is immaterial." United States v. Bausch &

Lomb Optical Co., supra note 13 at 723; Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
16. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., supra note 13, at 723.
17. Supra note 1, at 144.
18. Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
19. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). Kor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., spra note 18. In many ways, Parke, Davis & Co.
was similiar to the noted case. Here representatives of the manufacturer called on
the discounters and informed them that unless they would adhere to the suggested retail price, the manufacturer would discontinue dealing with them. Subsequently agreements were elicited from wholesalers to stop dealing with the
offending discounters. Relying on Beech-Nut and Bausch. & Lomb, the Court declared this to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
20. This clause prohibits the dealer from establishing "a new or different
location, branch sales office, or place of business ... without prior written approval
of Chevrolet." Supra note 1, at 130.
21. See Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1942), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695
(1943), where this "location clause" was construed to permit General Motors to
prohibit a non-tangent used car sales outlet.
22. Supra note 14.
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The antitrust rule which this case states23 is a narrow one in that reasonableness under the business circumstances of the alleged refusal to deal is of no
consequence if even one trader is excluded from the market,25 and that the efforts
of the manufacturer must be truly unilateral and must not involve either express or implied collaboration with wholesalers or other distributors. 26 Thus
the legal right to use independent judgment in choosing the customers with
whom it will deal, as announced in Colgate, becomes a right which the manufacturer may be unable to enforce. 27 If it is enforceable, the attendant difficulties
may make its enforcement unfeasible.
24

The Court's severe limitation on General Motors' attempt to protect its
distribution system is an inappropriate use of the per se rule. The merchandising
of new cars involves both interbrand competition on all levels and intrabrand
competition on the dealership level. Clearly, if the dealers attempt to divide the
market or prevent new entries thereto, they will violate the antitrust laws. 28 It
is not so clear that action on the level of the manufacturer," where intrabrand
competition does not exist, should be so limited, unless an unreasonable effect on
interbrand competition can be found. By applying the per se rule, the Court eliminates the necessity of showing this unreasonable effect. The consequences of this
approach cast doubt on the value to the manufacturer of attempting to maintain
a dealer franchise system of mercbandising. 30
The economic desirability of the dealer franchise system of merchandising new
cars is obvious. Without it the customer would have greater difficulty finding
large inventories of spare parts, and a system of new car warranties would be
difficult to maintain. To achieve this end, General Motors must now attempt to
enforce its "location clause" or unilaterally refuse to deal with dealers unwilling
to comply with its "no discount sales" program. If it pursues the latter course, it
must rely solely on the dealer's self interest to prompt adherence to the program.
The former method may work provided that such conduct does not violate the

23. Arguably this case does not establish any new rule. Mr. Justice Harlan
dissented in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 19, at 49. He concurred in the result in the noted case, 384 U.S. 148, feeling bound by the decision
of the Court in Parke, Davis & Co. although he thought that case represented
unsound antitrust doctrine.
24. The trial court at 234 F. Supp. 88 stressed the economic reasonableness
of the dealership system under which the dealers will make repairs, honor warranties, and maintain inventories of spare parts, as opposed to the discount
houses which only sold cars.
25. Supra note 18.
26. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 19.
27. Id. at 57 (dissenting opinion).
28. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
29. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
30. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966), where the Court upheld an FTC "cease and desist" order against the manufacturer who had contracted with retailers that in consideration for services provided by the manufacturer, the dealer would not carry competing lines. This order had been issued
prior to any showing of adverse effects on commerce or trade.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/14
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"good faith" requirement of the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act.81 It is
much preferable because good franchise holders are too difficult to obtain for the
manufacturer to show much enthusiasm for discontinuing them.
Although the Court has been unwilling to allow the manufacturer to achieve
absolute control over its franchises by use of the restrictive covenant,8 2 a covenant
such as the "location clause" should be allowed. Otherwise, it would seem that
the flow of commerce which the Court is zealously attempting to protect will be
crippled by decisions such as this, which will adversely affect the manufacturer's
control of its system of distribution. General Motors has lost this battle, but a
proper balancing of the values and abuses of a system which gives a manufacturer
some subsequent control of his product must be achieved in order to insure efficient
merchandising.
DAvID B. RoGERs

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVATE PERSONS SUCCEEDING CITY AS
TRUSTEE OF PARK UNDER RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY DEVISE
HELD SUBJECT TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Evans v. Newton1
In 1811 A. 0. Bacon devised, by remainder, a park to the Mayor and Council
of Macon, Georgia, in trust for the use "of the white women, white girls, white
boys and white children of the City of Macon.
...2 The city administered the
property according to the terms of the trust for many years but eventually admitted
Negroes. Members of the board of managers of the park (also established by the
will) brought an action in a Georgia state court to have the city removed as
trustee and for the appointment of private successors. The city answered that it
could not administer the trust according to its terms and asked for a declaration
of its duties and obligations in the property.
Negro citizens of Macon intervened in the action, alleging that the racially
discriminatory provision was violative of the public policy of the United States
and the Constitution and laws of Georgia. They further argued that the court
could not appoint private trustees "for the manifest purpose of operating, man31. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964) which reads in part: "An automobile dealer may
bring suit against any automobile manufacturer ... and shall recover the damages
by him sustained . .. by reason of the failure of said automobile manufacturer . . .
to act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise
with said dealer: Provided, That in any such suit the manufacturer shall not be
barred from asserting in defense . . . the failure of the dealer to act in good
faith."
32. See note 30 supra.
1. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
2. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 281, 138 S.E.2d 573, 574 (1964).
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aging, and regulating public property . . . in a racially discriminatory manner."3
The Negro intervenors argued that this would violate the Equal Protection Clause

and suggested that the court apply the doctrnie of cy pres and retain the city as
trustee. At this point other heirs of Bacon intervened in support of the board's
position and asked for reversion of the property to the estate should other relief
4
be denied.
The city then resigned as trustee and asked the court to accept this action.
The Negro intervenors opposed this, stating that the court could not accept the
resignation, and asked that the city be directed to continue administering the park
on a non-discriminatory basis.
The trial court accepted the city's resignation, appointed three private individuals as successor trustees and refused to pass on the question of the reversion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that Bacon "had the absolute right
to give and bequeath property to a limited class." 5 The court further stated that
since charitable trusts are within equity jurisdiction, the trial court had the power
to appoint new trustees to prevent failure of the trust purpose.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, 6 and subsequently
held that during the years that the city administered the park, it had gained
momentum as a public facility, and that the transfer of titie to the park from
public to private trustees under state law, without more, does not automatically
take the park out of the public domain so as to be free from the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is certain that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the States. The question
is, "What is state action?" Generally, state action has been found where the
state has lent its processes to the achievement of a racially discriminatory purpose.
State action has been found in the action of any agency of the state or of its
subdivisions,7 any member of the state judiciary,8 any executive officer, 9 legislative act,10 municipal ordinance, 11 improper enforcement of valid laws,12 and even
culpable official state inaction.' 3 The courts have divined the presence of the
state's power in less obvious forms, such as private action attributable to manda-

tory state statutes, 14 actions of lessees of state property 15 and actions of private
3. Id. at 282, 138 S.E.2d at 575.
4. Prior to the intervention of the Negro citizens, trustees of residuary
beneficiaries had joined with the petitioning members of the board of managers
in requesting removal of the city.
5. Supra note 2, at 285, 138 S.E.2d at 577.
6. Evans v. Newton, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
7. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
8. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
10. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
11. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
12. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
13. Catiette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943) (dictum).
14. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
15. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Dawson
v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd
per curtai, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W.
Va. 1948).
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organizations receiving state aid. 1' Thus, the only theoretical limit to the Equal
Protection Clause is that it does not apply to purely private action, 17 and even
this limitation now may seemingly be overcome by Congressional action.18 However, in a limited class of cases, and without a Congressional mandate, federal
courts have found state action where private individuals exercise public or governmental functions. 19 Evans u. Newton 20 is such a case.
The majority position is that a park once in the public domain acquires a
"public function." Therefore members of the public cannot be excluded from such
a park on racial grounds simply by a pro forina substitution of private trustees
for public trustees. Thus the public character previously acquired by this particular park makes it a public institution which cannot be operated on a racially
discriminatory basis, even in private hands. The Court emphasized Marsh v. Alabamna,21 which rested upon two findings: (1) that a private organization was performing a public function, and (2) that it called upon state law to aid in its
discriminatory purpose. These findings brought ostensibly private action within
the realm of state action.
Although the majority opinion implies that "parks" are a unique category,
it also makes clear that its ruling here is limited to the particular park in this case.
Thus the Girard problem is avoided, except for a gratuitous observation that "[ilf
a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only and in
no way implicated the State . . . we assume, arguendo, that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered." 2 2 This statement is a clear reference to the similar
factual context which was presented to the Court in Pennsylvania v. Board of
Trusts,2 3 a case in which the Philadelphia Board of Public Trusts, acting as trustee
under a racially discriminatory provision in Stephen Girard's will, which established
Girard College, was held to be subject to the Equal Protection Clause. On remand,
the Philadelphia Orphans' Court substituted private trustees for the Board, 24 and
on appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the substitution and held that
state action was thus ended. 25 The United States Supreme Court dismissed the
16. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curiam);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
17. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 8.
18. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (semble); United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (semble).
19. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Hawkins v. North Carolina
Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,
149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). Contra, Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 981 (1950).
20. Supra note 1.
21. Supra note 19, in which it was held that members of a religious sect
could not constitutionally be barred from exercising their freedom of speech by
distributing literature on the sidewalks of a privately owned company town.
22. Supra note 1, at 300.
23. Supra note 16.
24. Girard Estate, 7 Fid. 606 (Pa. 1957).
25. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
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appeal, and treating the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari, denied it.; 8
Thus, in that case, the Court declined to rule on the substitution question.
This implicit condonation of the Girard proceedings raises the most interesting
point in the majority opinion-the absence of any real reference to the view that
"estate action" can be found in a State judicial decree allocating property rights
in accordance with a private regime having a racially discrimintory design. The
court decree approving the resignation of the city and appointing successors might
easily be characterized as the type of requisite state action under the tests laid
28
27
down in the controversial cases of Shelley v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson,
which denied, respectively, specific performance of, and damages for, the breach
of racially restrictive covenants. However, the Court failed to cite either case,
thereby suggesting that Professor Wechsler's view was correct when he predicted
that the restrictive covenant cases would yield no basic principles applicable beyond the ad hoc determinations in those cases 2 9
In Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane,3 a distinction was drawn between
true public functions, such as political primary elections and company towns, and
other functions which are neither public nor private in themselves. Because of the
state's affirmative duty to prevent racial discrimination in the performance of true
public functions, even by individuals, little state aid or control is necessary to a
finding of state action. 3 ' Although primaries are necessary to our form of government, it is doubtful that the same is true of parks. In Evans, however, the majority opinion supplies a link with the state by speaking of the "momentum"
acquired by the park during years of municipal control. To prefer the "momentum"
distinction to the clear rationale offered by Shelley and Barrows is a further indication that the Court may be opposed to any extension of these cases.
Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion criticizes the majority for finding a
continued city involvement when there was nothing on the record to support it.
The majority opinion had bridged this omission by inferring an "involvement" in
the absence of proof to the contrary-a technique of which Mr. Justice White disapproved. In the light of the record in this case, however, and in view of the
schemes, subterfuges and legalisms persistently devised by persons presently
occupying political office in some states to escape the requirements of the Constitution, the inference of continued involvement is not unreasonable. The same
is also true with respect to another theoretical objection to justiciability. At the
time the litigation arose, the Negro intervenors had not yet been denied the use
of the facility, and, under orthodox theory, were not aggrieved. Arguably, therefore, they had no standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the proposed

26.
27.
28.
29.
Rrv. 1,
30.
31.

Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958) (per curiam).
Supra note 8.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H. v. L.
31 (1959).
212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
Rice v. Elmore, supra note 19.
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resignation and appointment.32 As in Adler v. Board of Eduw.,3 3 however, the
inevitability of a grievance would appear so dearly that to apply the requirement
would carry formalism to unrealistic lengths.
The concurring opinion finds the requisite state action in a state statute s4
which authorized the devise of parks on racial limitation. This view has merit,35
but the majority did not find it necessary to reach this issue. It may also be significant that a decision on this ground would have brought the Court closer to the
Shelley-Barrows zone, which it seemed so anxious to avoid; and this may explain
the majority's refusal to adopt the theory. In addition, this theory would impose
greater restrictions on settlors in states having such statutes than would be
suffered by settlors in states not having such statutes. It would do this by appropriating what might be a sincere and otherwise legitimate private sentiment, and
accounting for it in terms of legislative compulsion, an anomaly forcefully illustrated
36
by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Peterson v. City of Greenville.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, suggested that the majority found state action
by inferring that the state court decree would result in the operation of the park
on a racially discriminatory basis and joined with Mr. Justice White in concluding
that the record did not permit such an inference. This characterization of the majority opinion, insofar as it suggests a reliance on Shelley, is inaccurate. At only
one place in the majority opinion is there a suggestion that the "state action" requirement is supplied by a judicial decree, and, even at that point, it is the
judicial decree's mandate to perform a public function which the opinion emphasizes.
Mr. Justice Black concluded that the case should be remanded to the state
courts for decision of the question of the reversion under state law,3 7 assuming the
Court had any jurisdiction, since the constitutional issue was not litigated at the
state level. 8 Since Mr. Justice Black would have the case decided on the basis of
the reversioner's claims, he would have the speculation on the reach of Shelley
and Barrows determined once and for all-and would appear to favor having the
issue determined against any extension of those cases. This, obviously, was the
last thing the majority wanted to do.
Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented on the ground that the constitutional
issue, if presented at all, was not presented clearly enough to justify its resolution,
and concluded that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently
32. Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
33. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
34. GA. CoDE ANN. § 69-504 (1957).
35. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), holding that a designation
of political candidates by race on election ballots was unconstitutional because it
provided a "vehicle" for the operation of racial prejudice.
36. 373 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
37. Apparently this is just what the Georgia courts are doing on remand of
the case. Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
38. The Negro intervenors did raise the constitutional issue in the pleadings,
but the Supreme Court of Georgia held against their contention on the strength
of Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, supra note 16, and subsequent litigation concerning that matter, especially the Court's denial of certiorari after a similar substitution of trustees. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, supra note 26.
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granted, These dissents expressed considerable apprehension concerning the future
application of the "public function" theory of state action, particularly in the area
of private education. They expressed fear that such an approach would lead to an
unwarranted extension of federal power into areas heretofore considered to be
solely within the realm of private choice.
The rejection of a Shelley-Barrows solution to the problem in this case suggests judicial misgivings as to the propriety of the approaches approved by those
cases. This may be explained in terms of a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon mystique concerning land and the rules governing the allocation of its use.8 9 Alteration or suspension of those traditional rules simply because private persons are utilizing
them to achieve ends inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution involves a
serious departure from traditional constitutional adjudication. The right to devise property to a limited class is a right which the Supreme Court of Georgia
declared to be absolute. 40 This is clearly an overstatement; 41 but it is also clear
that the Supreme Court is not as willing to define the limits of this right as it was
in connection with the "absolute right" of a State legislature to draw municipal
42
boundaries.
Despite the reluctance of the Court to pass upon the reach of Shelley, there
is no doubt that the power to engage in private discrimination has been seriously
curtailed by private abuses of the powers existing under rules of state law, especially those of property, to perpetuate racial injustice. The racially restrictive
covenant was "an attempt to achieve a result by . . . contract which the Supreme
Court has said could not be achieved by ordinance." 43 Another device, on which
the Court has yet to rule (although Mr. Justice Black appears ready) is the
conveyance to a municipality of a fee simple determinable estate upon a racially
discriminatory condition. Although such a reverter operates "automatically," it
still operates by force and reason of law and might be considered state action when
the condition occurs. 44
As a practical matter, the decisions in Shelley and Barrows, if carried to the
limit of their logic, foreclose enforcement of private individual's right to discriminate racially in his personal contacts. The Court in Shelley indicated that the lack
39. See e.g., 5A CORBIN, CoTmRAcrs § 1143 (1964).
40. Evans v. Newton, supra note 2, at 285, 138 S.E.2d at 577.
41. See Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights,
15 HASTINGs L. J. 135 (1963), arguing that the common law has generally
accommodated property rights to civil rights and the general welfare whenever
there has been a clash between them.
42. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Evans the power of the
state court to substitute trustees to prevent failure of the trust was never questioned and in Gomillion no one questioned the state legislative power to redraw
municipal boundaries. The existence of the power is a fact, but the use of it for
the fulfillment of an unconstitutional design is prohibited. In Evans what seems
troublesome is not the fact of the trial court's decree per se, but is what that decree
orders to be done, i.e., the exercise of a public function.
43. Lowe, Racial Restrictive Covenants, 1 ALA. L. REv. 15, 26, (1948).
44. See, Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 421 (1955). Contra, Charlotte Park &
Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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of a remedy for the breach of this right does not end the right, so long as the
State was not called upon to enforce it. But, "[wihen enforcement is unconstitutional ... there remains but a wraith of the right." 45 In Evans the Court declined
to face the problems generated by this earlier rationale. The Court suggests a limitation on the Shelley-Barrows rationale by assuming arguendo that a testator can
constitutionally leave a segregated school to private persons, if he does not involve
the State.4 6 However, were a Negro to demand admission, how might he be excluded? Or, if otherwise competent trustees disregard the settlor's racial directions
and substitution is refused, what recourse is available!
Desiring to retain some area of legitimate choice in personal contacts while
at the same time not wishing to condone the artifices employed in Evans, the
Court distinguishes a park from the Girard-type school by finding that involvement
of the state in the administration of the park had been fostered through long-term
municipal control. The Court then finds that the mere manipulation of technical
"tide" under state law is not enough to terminate the public characteristics of the
park, and the maneuver is treated like the civil law "simulation." The opinion,
however, raises all of the problems created when a qualitative distinction is raised
to the level of decisive doctrine. What, after all, is a "public function?" We are told
that the park is a public function because it is in the "public domain," but we
are not told how to distinguish public from private functions. Is this distinction to be likened to the distinction between governmental and proprietary
function, so spectacularly unsuccessful as a test for municipal tort liability? Although the majority opinion suggests the existence of an accommodation between
the competing principles of private choice and the constitutional requirement
of equal protection of the laws, it supplies no blueprint.
While the concept of "state action" has remained externally the same, two
clearly divergent judicial viewpoints have developed. One line of cases requires
nothing less than some actual official involvement in the challenged activity. Is
the individual or organization "an agency of the state"?47 Has the state provided
"the ways and means for a private individual or corporation to discriminate
against its own citizens"? 48 These questions demand knowledge of the degree to
which the state involves itself in the enterprise. 49 Marsh v. Alabama50 and Evans
v. Newton51 take a different tack. These cases demand knowledge of the kind
of activity being carried on. Is the activity in the "public domain" or does it
involve a "public function"? These cases represent an attempt to formulate a
qualitative test for state action.
The qualitative test seems to offer the best means of accommodating the
Fourteenth Amendment protections with the limited privilege to indulge idio45. Traynor, Law & Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 ILL. L. F.
230, 238.
46. Supra note 1, at 300.
47. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, stpra note 16.
48. Lawrence v. Hancock, supra note 15, at 1009.
49. Supra note 30.
50. Supra note 19.
51. Supra note 1.
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repudiation of the

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Evans, the Supreme
Court of Georgia has remanded the case for a consideration of the reversion question.02 Unfortunately, the conspicuously unsubtle action of the Georgia court
raises the very question which the Supreme Court was at pains to avoid-namely,
whether a court decree declaring a reversion of the property because of use consistent with the Constitution but inconsistent with the settlor's private directions
is unconstitutional state action under Shelley and Barrows.
It is ironic that once again53 the Georgia Supreme Court, which has frequently expressed hostility towards undue extensions of Fourteenth Amendment
rights, is the same court which, by adopting in this case an unyielding position
with respect to so-called "absolute property rights," seems determined to compel the United States Supreme Court to decide a question which may well bring
about the very result to which the Georgia Court is opposed.
DEVON F. SHERWOOD

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON DEFAMATION--QUALIFIED
PRIVILEGE APPLIED AGAINST PRIVATE INDIVIDUALACTUAL MALICE
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat1
Dr. Linus Pauling is a man of international repute as a scientist and scholar.
Among his many awards and honors are the 1954 Nobel Prize in chemistry,
the Nobel Peace Prize and recognition by the United States for meritorious
service during World War 11.2 The alleged libel in the noted case grew out of
Pauling's attempt to promote a nuclear test ban treaty. His efforts, especially
the delivery to the United Nations of a petition signed by 11,021 scientists
from around the world and calling for an end to nuclear testing, drew the
attention of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee
(hereinafter referred to as the Dodd Subcommittee). He was subpoenaed to
appear before the Subcommittee on June 21, 1960, at which time he was questioned concerning the signatures, the names of the people who had helped collect them, and the letters with which they had been transmitted. Pauling ob52. Supra note 37.
53. McKay, Georgia Versus the United States Supreme Court, 4 J. PuB. L.
285 (1955).
1. 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
2. Id. at 189.
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jected to this but was ordered to return on August 9th (later changed to October
11, 1960) with the signatures and the letters.
Pauling then sought declaratory relief in federal district court from the
order of the Dodd Subcommittee. His petition was dismissed August 23, 1960,
and the dismissal affirmed September 7, 1960. 3 Certiorari was subsequently denied
on November 21, 1960. 4
Pauling's activities incurred the wrath of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat.
The alleged libel grew out of an editorial entitled "Glorification of Deceit, "'
printed October 10, 1960, which accused Pauling of being cited for contempt of
Congress for refusing to testify before the Dodd Subcommittee and of appealing
to the federal courts, without success, to rid himself of the contempt citation.
On October 11, 1960, Pauling reappeared before the Dodd Subcommittee
and produced the signatures. A list of the people who had helped gather them
had already been produced, and the Subcommittee did not ask for the letters by
which they had been transmitted. At the end of the hearing, Pauling was released from the subpoena. Contrary to the Globe-Democrat's accusation, at no
time had he been cited for contempt of Congress.
Pauling then brought suit for libel against the Globe-Democrat in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. After a jury verdict
for defendant, he appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that
the defendant was liable as a matter of law since the defamatory statement
which clearly imputed a crime, contempt of Congress, was admittedly false and
was made with no justification.0 Pauling also alleged error in the instructions and
the admission of evidence.
However, the court affirmed the judgment entirely on defendant's argument
that Pauling had failed to plead and prove a claim for relief for libel under
constitutional standards laid down by the Supreme Court in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan.7 The Times case held that a false statement of fact relating to the official
conduct of a public official could be conditionally privileged, if made without
actual malice. The court of appeals felt that this principle could logically be extended to cover false statements about a private person who seeks to use his
power and prestige to influence a matter of public policy, public controversy, and
pressing public concern. Consequently, the court held that Dr. Pauling's activities
fell into that area where the first and fourteenth amendments afford privilege
to critical comments which are free from actual malice, i.e., a statement made
either with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it

3. Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
4. Pauling v. Eastland, 364 U.S. 900 (1960).
5. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 199.
6. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 192.
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this decision, the Supreme Court firmly adopted
the minority view as laid out in Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 Pac. 281 (Kan. 1908).
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was false or not.3 The court also found no showing of actual malice which would
justify a new trial on this issue.9
In extending the qualified privilege rule to a situation where a private individual has voluntarily injected himself into an area of public concern, the court
of appeals was faced with the problem that the Supreme Court has never pushed
the doctrine past the public official level. However, the court treated footnote 23
in the Times case10 and footnote 12 in Rosenblatt v. Baer,11 the latest Supreme
Court case dealing with the Times principle, as clear implications that the doctrine
12
is an expanding one.
The court of appeals also had to reject the opinion of some courts and
writers that Times should not be extended past the public official. The three
principal arguments against such extension are:
1. The decision in Times was reached to give the private citizen a
reciprocal right against the public official, who has complete immunity
from defamation suits for acts done in the line of duty.'3 However, a
citizen should have no right against a fellow citizen who lacks the
official's privilege. 14
2. A public official has undertaken duties and responsibilities to the
public at large, and his right to a good reputation must be balanced
against the right of the public to know about those who govern them.
However, a private person has not surrendered part of his right to a good
name and reputation, which can be defended only through the use of
libel laws. These laws safeguard individual civil rights and should not
be whittled away. 6
3. Extending the Times rule to private persons would have a repressive effect on free speech because it would inhibit persons from
speaking out on matters of public concern for fear of being libeled. 16
In rejecting these arguments, the court of appeals has probably accurately
predicted future developments in the area of constitutional limitations on defama8. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 196-97. For another recent
case which denied plaintiff relief because of a feeling that his activities were
such as to justify a qualified privilege, see Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
9. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, sipra note 1, at 198.
10. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964), wherein the
Supreme Court refused to specify what categories of persons would be included.
11. 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.12 (1966), wherein the Court again declined to specify
other possible bases for applying qualified privilege, expressly mentioning a person
who voluntarily thrusts himself into an area of pressing public concern.
12. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 195. But see Dempsey v.
Time, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1964), aff'd, 22 App. Div.2d 854,
254 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964); Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 48
Misc.2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1965) (which would seem to be beyond any proposed extension).
13. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

14. Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 349 (1965).
15. Rosenblatt v. Baer, s.npra note 11, at 91 (Justice Stewart, concurring);
Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. granted,
87 Sup. Ct. 40 (1966); Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965).
16. Notes, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 349, 354 (1965); 51 VA. L. REv. 106, 119

(1965).
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tion.17 In footnote 10 of Rosenblatt v. Baer,1s the Supreme Court itself rejected
the idea that Times was tied to Barr v. Matteo,19 saying that the public interests
protected by the Times rule are interests in discussion, not retaliation: "[Tlhe
scope of the privilege is to be determined by reference to the functions it serves."
The qualified privilege rule serves to promote discussion on public issues.
If truth or fair comment are the only defenses to a defamation action, would-be
critics will be deterred from good faith public comment for fear of being incorrect
or from the desire to avoid the difficulty and expense of proving the truth of the
statement in court. The effect will be to dampen the vigor and limit the variety of
public debate. 20 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited and robust.21 Thus, in weighing the interest in public discussion of public
matters against the safeguarding of individual reputation, the Court has shifted
the balance in favor of freedom of public discussion. On this basis, two state
courts have recently extended qualified privilege to cover a situation where the
plaintiff, a private individual, voluntarily entered an area of intense public concern.22 Since the emphasis is on discussion, a restriction of the qualified privilege
rule to public officials would seem to be artificial. 23 Although a public official plays
an obvious role in public affairs, a private person can also influence the course of
public issues. Where he attempts to do so and is criticized, should he be allowed
recovery on a showing of a false statement of fact where his public counterpart
24
would not?
Whether an extension of the Times doctrine will have a repressive effect on
free speech is a most difficult question. No court has dealt with it directly. Presumably, those courts extending the qualified privilege rule have felt that the
17. One must take note at this point that Dr. Pauling has applied for
certiorari. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), Petition for
cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3082 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1966) (No. 522). Whether it is
granted or not, a decision in this area should be forthcoming since the Supreme
Court has already granted certiorari in Assocated Press v. Walker, supra note 15.
18. Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 11, at 84.
19. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
20. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, supr4 note 10, at 279. For discussion of the impact of Times on the defenses of fair comment and qualified privilege, see Taylor,
Constitutional Limitations on the Defenses of Fair Comment and Conditional
Privilege, 30 Mo. L. REv. 467 (1965).
21. Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 11, at 85; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, supra
note 10, at 270.
22. Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966);
Pauling v. Nat'l Review, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966). Contra, Powell v. Monitor
Publishing Co., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966).
23. Strong support for this can be drawn from Judge Friendly's dictum in
Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964), from the concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, supra
note 10, at 293, and Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 11, at 94. See also, Pedrick,
Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: A Modern Revised Translation, 49
CORNELL

L.Q. 581, 592 (1964).

24. A New York court said no to this question in Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App.
Div.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29,
207 N.E.2d 620 (1965).
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need for public debate, which would be much broader if would-be critics were protected for false statements of fact made without actual malice, far outweighs the
possible inhibiting effect on those who speak out on matters of public concern. It
is probable that this argument will carry as little weight as did the arguments of
the pre-Times courts that extending a qualified privilege to those who criticize
public officials would discourage good men from seeking office.
The weakest part of the court of appeals' decision was its ruling not to grant
Dr. Pauling a new trial in order to try to show that even through the defendant
had a qualified privilege, it was abused.25 The heart of the court's ruling was its
holding that Pauling's allegations added up to something far less than actual
malice when compared with the Times' definition of malice, i.e., a statement made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.20 Pauling urged that actual malice had been shown at the trial because the
defendant's editor admitted he knew Pauling had not been cited for contempt,
but thought that he was about to be. In addition, Pauling urged that much
stronger evidence of actual malice could have been shown because of a campaign
of personal vilification carried on by the Globe-Democrat in the form of letters to
the editor, a cartoon labeled "COMMY" and a series of adverse editorial comments. 27 The court said that these did not show actual malice but, at best, showed
reportorial negligence or antagonism or contempt for Pauling and his views and
methods, 28 all of which have been rejected by the Supreme Court as proof of
20

actual malice.

However, the refusal to grant a new trial seems contrary to the decisions
reached in Pape v. Time, Inc.30 and Gilligan v. King.31 In Pape, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower court was correct in applying Times
to the plaintiff, but it reversed a summary judgment for defendant and remanded the case for trial because the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of
actual malice so that a jury could find that defendant had acted with reckless
disregard of whether the statement was false or not. In Gilligan, a New York
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, even though Times clearly applied,
because the issue of actual malice is a fact question which should be determined
by the jury. The evidence of actual malice in these cases was far less than in
Dr. Pauling's case.
25. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 198.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. Presumably, this was not offered because Pauling thought that the
false content of the October 10th editorial was sufficient to meet his burden
of proof under the pre-Times Missouri law of libel. The court intimated that
plaintiff should have framed his case in light of Times since that decision was
handed down a week before trial and defendant attempted to apply it by amending his pleading. The trial court ruled that Times did not apply but allowed the
amendment to preserve the point for appeal.
28. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 198.
29. Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 11, at 84; Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356,
357 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73, 78-79 (1964); N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 288.
30. 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966).
31. 48 Misc.2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1965).
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The court reinforced its decision not to grant a new trial by pointing out that
the lower court verdict against Pauling was based on jury instructions more
favorable than any which could have been given under Times. 32 But since they
refused to consider the reasons advanced by Pauling for error, the court should
not have allowed the verdict to influence its decision not to grant a new trial.
Since a qualified privilege was allowed by the court against Dr. Pauling because of his activities in an area of intense public concern, where previously there
had been no such privilege, it would seem that he should have been granted a
new trial in order to try to prove that the defendant had abused this privilege.
Ricmnx

L. WEL-x

UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-SETTLEMENT WITH TORTFEASOR
Kisling v. MFA Mt.

Ins. Co.1

Plaintiff was involved in a three car collision with an uninsured motorist and
an insured motorist, both of whom were negligent. Plaintiff sued them jointly,
eventually settling with the insured motorist and executing a covenant not to sue.
Later both tortfeasors were dismissed without prejudice. In the meantime plaintiff
sued her insurance company under the uninsured motorist coverage of her automobile insurance policy. This coverage provided that the insurance company was
to pay plaintiff for bodily injuries sustained from an uninsured motorist.2 The insurer pleaded that the covenant not to sue amounted to a settlement and that
because plaintiff settled with the insured motorist, plaintiff was precluded from
recovery by an exclusion in the policy which provided that the uninsured motorist
coverage did not apply when the insured settled without the consent of the insurance company.a The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that

32. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 1, at 198-99.
1. 399 S.W.2d 245 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966).
2. MFA contracted to "pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sustained by the insured. .. ." Id. at 247.
3. Uninsured motorist coverage "does not apply . . . to bodily injury to an
insured with respect to which such insured . . . shall, without the written consent
of EMFA], make any settlement with, or prosecute to judgment any action against
any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor." Id. at 248. The
court divided this into the settlement prohibition and the judgment prohibition.
The judgment prohibition was earlier declared invalid in State ex rel. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963). The judgment prohibition (i.e., the words "or prosecute to judgment any action against")
has since been deleted from the standard form of the automobile liability policy.

RisjoRD & AUSTIN,

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES

115, §§ 9:11, 9:112

(1965).
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plaintiff could not recover. It found that the plain language of the settlement prohibition was applicable to any person who might be liable and not merely to the
uninsured motorist. 4
Underlying the case is the problem whether an insurance company should be
allowed subrogation rights for payments under uninsured motorist coverage. The
"no settlement without consent" exclusion protects the insurer from an unauthorized settlement which, with an accompanying covenant not to sue or release, would deprive the insurer of its opportunity to recover by subrogation all
or part of what it had to pay the policyholder. 5 This no settlement exclusion can
have no value for the insurer unless the insurer has a right of subrogation. Subrogation rights are provided for by a trust agreement which says that the insured will
hold in trust for the insurance company all rights which he has against the tort4. Note the wording "make any settlement with... any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor." Supra note 3. (Emphasis added.) Kisling
rejected both the contention that the "no settlement without consent" exclusion
was applicable only to settlements with the uninsured tort-feasor and the contention that the exclusion was ambiguous and should be construed against the insurance company. Nevertheless, it would have been easy for the insurance company to specifically provide in the policy that the "no settlement without consent"
exclusion applies to joint tort-feasors thus resolving potential ambiguity. Further,
the word "any" could be interpreted to include only a principal or a master of the
uninsured tort-feasor and not necessarily a joint tort-feasor. The cases, however,
have not recognized these possibilities. See, e.g., Kisling, sutpra note 1 at 248.
5. The purpose of such a clause is to protect insurer's subrogation rights.
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Torrance, 110 Ga. App. 4, 137 S.E.2d 551 (1964),
a f'd, 220 Ga. 639, 140 S.E.2d 840 (1965); Mills v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 231 CaL
App. 2d 124, 41 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1964). See also Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157,
159, 181 A.2d 634, 636 (1962), where the court says, "who [insurer] will then be
subrogated to the plaintiff's rights against the uninsured motorist." Such a clause
also prevents double recoveries by the insured. Mills v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra.
California has a statute providing for uninsured motorist coverage which has a
clause identical to the "no settlement without consent" exclusion involved here.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(c) (3).
If plaintiff's damage (e.g., $12,000) were in excess of his uninsured motorist
coverage limits (e.g., $5000) and if plaintiff collected this limit and then sued the
insured joint tort-feasor, the partial recovery ($5000) could conceivably be handled
two ways. Plaintiff could collect his total damages from the insured joint tortfeasor ($12,000) and then reimburse his uninsured motorist carrier; or the jury
could be told to reduce the recovery against the tort-feasor by the amount of the
prior recovery from the uninsured motorist carrier. The only authority indicates
the former procedure would be followed although there was no discussion of the latter possibility. Mills v. Farmers Ins. Exch., sUpra; Chadwick and Poch6, California's
Uninsured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 194 (1961);
Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 516 (1960). To follow the latter procedure would
make the insured joint tort-feasor (who is liable for the total damages) a third
party beneficiary of the contract between plaintiff and his insurance company. The
result would be as if plaintiff had settled with the uninsured motorist and to this
extent would make the uninsured motorist carrier an insurer of the uninsured
motorist contrary to the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. Southern v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 236 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Va. 1964); Home v. Superior
Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962). See also Kirouac v. Healey,
supra and State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, supra note 3.
If no subrogation were allowed, then the latter approach might be necessary to
prevent double recoveries though the same objections would still apply.
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feasor. 6 This device seems to have two purposes. One is to keep the insurer out of
any case as a real party in interest. 7 The other is to avoid the rule prohibiting
assignment of a personal tort.8 Whether the latter purpose is successful depends
upon whether a distinction should be drawn between assignment and subrogation.
Assignment has been characterized as a complete divestment of the assignor's
rights in the assignee and a continued existence of the claim or debt.9 With subrogation, however, the subrogor retains legal title to the claim and passes only an
equitable pro tanto right to the subrogee. 10 Further, subrogation presupposes
actual payment rather than continued existence of the debt or claim. 11 Only an
Ilinois case' 2 has specifically recognized this distinction between assignment and
subrogation in dealing with uninsured motorist coverage. Missouri has recognized
3
the distinction in dealing with real party in interest problems,' but has refused
to recognze it relative to medical payments coverage in an automobile insurance
policy.' 4 Since Missouri has compared uninsured motorist insurance to medical
payments insurance,15 this refusal becomes critical, for it indicates that subroga6. Trust Agreement: "In the event of payment to any person under this
Part: (a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made; (b) such
person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of recovery
which he shall have against such other person or organization because of the damages which are the subject of claim made under this Part. .. ." RisjoaD & AUSTIN,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 118. Compare CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) which expressly authorizes subrogation for uninsured motorist coverage.
The "any person" phrase here is subject to the same objections as the same
phrase in the "no settlement without consent" exclusion. See note 4, supra. It is
also arguable that the insurance company pays under the policy only because the
uninsured tort-feasor is "legally responsible" and not because a joint tort-feasor
(who is insured) is "legally responsible" thereby resulting in subrogation rights
only against the uninsured tort-feasor.
7. This would be done anyway in Missouri. Greene & Lloyd, Automobile Insurance-Assig-izent, Subrogation and the Real Party In Interest Statute in Missouri, 26 Mo. L. REv. 62 (1961). A trust receipt might also be issued at time of
loss payment. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRAcrIcE 86 (1964).
8. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955).
9. Bernardini v. Home Auto. Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499
(1965); Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961);
Hayes v. Jenkins, 337 S.W.2d 259 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960). See also Greene & Lloyd,
suprn note 7; 16 CoucH, INsURANCE 2d § 61:92 (1966).
10. Authorities cited note 9 supra.
11. Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., supra note 9; 16 COUCH, op. cit. supra
note 9.
12. Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc., supra note 9.
13. Hayes v. Jenkins, supra note 9; Greene & Lloyd, supra note 7.
14. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965),
is particularly significant because both it and Kisling were decided by Judge Stone
less than six months apart. See also Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 CaL
App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963) (refusing to recognize distinction); Damhesel
v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 876
(1965)' (recognizing the distinction).
15. State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, supra note 3. Medical insurance here refers to medical payments coverage in an automobile insurance
policy.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

43

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 14
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

tion under uninsured motorist coverage would be considered as an assignment of a
personal tort and thus prohibited.
Not only has uninsured motorist coverage been compared to medical insurance,
but it has also been compared to accident insurance.16 The three, however, have
some crucial differences. 17 Recovery with uninsured motorist insurance is not restricted to actual medical and allied expenses. It may also include loss of wages
or other income, loss of support, and compensation for pain and suffering. It applies only where there is legal liability; whereas medical and accident insurance
apply regardless of liability. Moreover, uninsured motorist and medical insurance
look to reimbursement of the insured for the actual loss he sustained up to policy
limits rather than a set rate per injury as with accident insurance. This last
characteristic seems to put uninsured motorist insurance, and medical payments
insurance, in the general class of indemnity insurance.
Indemnity insurance attempts to make the insured whole again by reimbursing him for the actual loss he sustained.' 8 This concept is pertinent because of
the general rule that subrogation is allowed only with indemnity insurance; and if
the uninsured motorist coverage could be placed in this class, then there is substantial authority requiring that subrogation be allowed.1 9 Indemnity insurance
for which subrogation is allowed has been limited to property insurance. 20 This
is understandable because heretofore there has been no way for an insurance company to be subrogated to anything but a tortious property loss. Life insurance is
not indemnity insurance and accident insurance is distinguished because it pays a
set rate per injury instead of actual loss suffered. 21 No occasion for subrogation
arises with liability insurance because whenever the insurer must pay, the insured is the tortfeasor. Therefore uninsured motorist coverage presents the first
practical opportunity for subrogation to the insured's personal loss.
As a matter of public policy, however, subrogation for uninsured motorist
insurance has both advantages and disadvantages. It allows for lower premium
16. State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, swpra note 3;
Kirouac v. Healey, supra note 5; Denny, UninsuredMotorist Coverage-Presentand
Future, 52 VA. L. REv. 538 (1966). Contra, Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc., supra
note 9.
17. Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc., supra note 9; FiaE, CASUALTY & SURETY
BULLETINS, CASUALTY & SURETY SEcTION, ATrro (CASUALTY),

Frlu-3 (1965).

18. 1 CoucH, INSURANCE 2d § 1:9 (1959); HORN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 29;
Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. REv.
841 (1962); King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L.

REv. 62 (1951).
19. 16 CoucH, INSURANCE 2d § 61:169 (1966); VAcE, INSURANCE § 134 (3d
ed. 1951); HORN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 31. Sometimes a distinction is made between legal (common law) and conventional (contractual) subrogation suggesting
that while the indemnity feature is necessary to have the former, the latter may
be provided for at will. Kimball & Davis, supra note 18; 3 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE
LAw & PRAcnicE § 1675 (1941); HORN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 31; Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 276
(1961).
20. E.g., CoucH, op. cit. supra note 19.
21. VANCE, Op. cit. supra note 19.
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rates if the potential subrogation rights are taken into consideration,2 2 and it permits the tortfeasor, who is primarily liable, to be held responsible whenever he is
not judgment proof.23 When coupled with the "no settlement without consent"
exclusion, the right of subrogation prevents the insured from fixing the ultimate
incidence of loss by accidental, capricious or collusive means, or from getting double recoveries. 24 It does not give rise to the underlying reasons for holding assignments of personal torts to be void as against public policy 2 5 Further, since the
trust agreement is a form of conventional or contractual subrogation, to deny it
effect could be an infringment of freedom of contract. 26
On the other hand, subrogation rights may not be included in the insurance
rate structure, thus resulting in a windfall for the insurance companies. 27 The
insured might settle in good faith, but violate the exclusionary clause protecting
subrogation rights, thereby losing his right to make a claim under the policy.
This would be especially harsh where the uninsured motorist was judgment proof,
and the insured motorist released him so he would not lose his driver's permit.
Such a situation suggests the insured is not getting what he paid for and that the
insurer is unjustly enriched. 28 There is the possibility that the subrogation claim
will complicate and discourage settlements. This problem has two aspects. First,
written consent must be obtained from the insurer before settling; this may be inconvenient or the insurer unwilling to consent. Second, there is the possibility of
multiple subrogation claims where a plaintiff is covered for the same injury by
several overlapping policies, each with subrogation rights, which would lead to
disputes between subrogation claimants. 29 Finally, the no settlement exclusion
22. One estimate gives insurance companies a 33-1/3% recovery from uninsured motorists. George, Insuring Injuries Caused by Uninsured Motorists, 1956

INs. LJ. 715, 718 (1956). That subrogation recoveries do enter the rate structure,
HORN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 25, 173. That they do not, PATr sON, ESSENTALS
OF INSURANcE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1957); King, supra note 18. That they do not work
a perceptible reduction in the premium charge, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley,
supra note 14.

23. Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 YALE L.J. 69 (1935); HORN,
op. cit. supra note 7 at 24.

24. Mills v. Farmers Ins. Exch., su'pra note 5; Campbell, supra note 23.
25. Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc., supra note 9 (claim for unliquidated
damages for personal injury too uncertain and too personal to assign without encouraging trade in quarrels). City of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176, 152
P.2d 836 (1944); Beechwood v. Joplln-Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 173 Mo. App. 371, 158
S.W. 868 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913); Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of
Choses in Action by the Comnon Law, 33 HAuv. L. REv. 997, 1022 (1920). With

subrogation the insurer's claim is for a fixed amount which has already been paid
the insured.
26. Kimball & Davis, supra note 18.
27. Authorities cited note 23, supra.
28. See King, supra note 18, citing Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246
N.Y. 162, 158 N.E. 60 (1927), and suggesting that the burden of proving that
damages could be recovered from the tort-feasor be put on the insurer, thus removing the automatic forfeiture of the insured's rights under the policy.
29. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, swpra note 14. While this case involved medical payments coverage, the same situation could arise with uninsured
motorist coverage (which would pay medical expenses), medical payments coverage, hospital and medical service plans like Blue Cross and Blue Shield and accident insurance.
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might inhibit the insured from settling with each of the joint tortfeasors and from
thereby obtaining a larger recovery.30
By upholding the settlement prohibition, Kisling has necessarily recognized
subrogation rights to uninsured motorist coverage. The opinion indicates that the
court had subrogation rights in mind by saying that the settlement prohibition
looks toward the end of not increasing costs of uninsured motorist coverage "unreasonably" and "unnecessarily." 3 ' The court then cites a Georgia case which
specifically states that the purpose of the settlement prohibition is to preserve
the insurer's right of subrogation.3 2 Thus Kiding has recognized a right of subrogation for bodily injuries; and unless the court is now willing to recognize a distinction between assignment and subrogation, it has allowed assignment of a personal
tort. Since both uninsured motorist coverage and medical payments insurance
appear to be a form of indemnity insurance, the two Missouri cases, Kisling and
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley,33 cannot be reconciled.
Assuming that subrogation rights are considered in the rate structure, subrogation for uninsured motorist coverage should be allowed. The occasional harsh results
should rapidly diminish as lawyers and the public in general become more familiar
with uninsured motorist coverage. Further, even though settlements may be somewhat more complicated, the overall gain to the public at large in the form of lower
premiums should more than compensate for the occasional inconvenience.
JOHN Z. WILLIAMs

30. This could arise where one joint tort-feasor is uninsured but financially
responsible, e.g., a large corporation, and where the other joint tort-feasor is insured. Plaintiff's damages might be worth at most $25,000 if prosecuted to a judgment. Because plaintiff could hold either tort-feasor individually to the full $25,000,
each tort-feasor might settle for $15,000 thereby giving plaintiff a $30,000 recovery.
31. Kisling v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 1 at 251.
32. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Torrance, supra note 5, at 5, 137 S.E.2d
at 553, where court says, "ET]he insurer is entitled to contract to protect its rights
against the uninsured motorist in the event of payment under the policy..
33. Cases cited note 14, supra.
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OF

State ex rel. Mid-Anerica Pipeline Co. v. Rooney1

Plaintiff Shanks sued defendant-relator Mid-America Pipeline Company for
damages to plaintiff's land and property resulting from construction of a pipeline.
Relator had condemned a right-of-way across plaintiff's land and had covenanted
to pay plaintiff for damages resulting from the construction.
Plaintiff served interrogatories on relator, asking detailed information as to
the time, place and manner of entering upon plaintiff's property, excavation and
construction of the pipeline, and the nature and description of equipment used.
Relator's answer to all the interrogatories was that it had employed Williams
Brothers Construction Company as an independent contractor to construct the
pipeline, that it did not supervise construction, and that it "does not have any
information or knowledge in regard to said construction of said pipeline which
would enable it to answer plaintiff's interrogatories ....
2
Plaintiff's motion to compel answers was sustained by the trial court, and
relator sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the motion. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals granted the writ, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering further answers because the information was
not available to relator.
Missouri Rule 56.01 states that interrogatories to a corporate party shall be
answered by "any officer or agent who shall furnish such information as is available to the party." 3 "Available" has two aspects. First, the information sought
may be within either the personal or corporate knowledge of the party interrogated. Second, the information sought may be obtainable from a source under
the interrogated party's control 4
Although the truthfulness of the answer given by relator was not controverted, it is questionable that the information sought was not within the personal
or corporate knowledge of relator. The court of appeals interpreted relator's answer
to mean not only that the corporation's officers, agents and employees had no
personal knowledge, but also that the corporation had secured no knowledge from
Williams Brothers. But the relator must have had some information. There
must have been some agreement between relator and Williams Brothers concerning construction which would contain specifications of starting and completion
dates. It is also unlikely that relator failed to inspect the work as it progressed
or accepted the work without inspection.
1. 399 S.W.2d 225 (Y.C. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Id. at 226.
3. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01. (Emphasis added.) FED. R. Civ. P. 33 has an
identical provision.
4. The availability problem should not be confused with the situation where
the interrogated party objects to the question because it requires burdensome
research of data in its possession to compile an answer. See 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF;
FEDmAL PRACTICE ANM PRocEuRE § 768 (1961), and State ex rel. Gamble Constr.
Co. v. Carroll, 408 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
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The no "information or knowledge" answer may be insufficient in circumstances where the interrogated party must have some information. 5 A federal
court has held that an answer of "no corporate knowledge" was insufficient
where it was clear that the interrogated party had obtained some information.6
An answer of "no information or knowledge" is no better. Where the interrogating party is seeking information available to the interrogated party, the latter
should be required to explain why the information is not available.7 For example,
if relator accepted the work without inspection then this should be his answer.
An answer that Williams Brothers was an independent contractor using its own
equipment and supplying its own supervisors does not mean that relator is
ignorant of the information sought. Yet the court of appeals decision requires the
trial judge to accept the no "information or knowledge" answer. This limits his
discretion in interrogatories and provides a subterfuge to thwart the discovery
procedure.
The other aspect of availability is whether the information may be obtained
from a source under the control of the interrogated party. Respondent contended
that an independent contractor performing a non-delegable duty becomes an agent
and is under his principal's control Relator simply contended that Williams
Brothers was an independent contractor and not under relator's control The
court did not decide this issue since it considered the information unavailable to
relator. But even if Williams Brothers was an undisputed independent contractor without a von-delegable duty to complicate matters, the principal may
still retain enough control to meet the availability requirement of Missouri Rule
56.01. The principal controls the date of starting construction, probably the date
of completion, and possibly the type of equipment and construction techniques to
be used. The problem is the degree of control necessary to meet the availability
requirement. Federal decisions indicate that a corporation cannot avoid answering interrogatories when it can obtain the information not only from agents'0 and
employees," but also from representatives,' 2 persons who have acted in its be5. See Riley v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 230, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 30 F.R.D. 358 (D.R.I. 1962); Breeland v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 179 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
6. Riley v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra note 5.
7. United States v. Nysco Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
8. Brief for Respondent, pp. 4-5, State ex rel. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v.
Rooney, supra note 1.
9. Brief for Relator, p. 9, State ex rel. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Rooney,
supra note 1.
10. Steelman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 F.R.D. 120 (W.D. Mo.
1964); Wycoff v. Nichols, 32 F.R.D. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Levatino Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 214 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Bank of Greece v.
Goulandris Bros., 134 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also State ex rel. Uregas
Serv. Co. v. Adams, 364 Mo. 389, 262 S.W.2d 9 (En Banc 1953); 4 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 33.26 (2d ed. 1966); 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. Mt.
spra note 4, at 329.
11. Wyatt v. Pennsylvania R.R., 154 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1957). See also
State ex rel. Uregas Serv. Co. v. Adams, supra note 10.
12. Steelman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 10; Wycoff v.
Nicholas, supra note 10.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/14

48

et al.: Recent Cases

19671

RECENT CASES

half,13 and sources under its control. 14 Unfortunately, the latter broad expressions
are nowhere defined, and the cases in which they appear involved agents who
doubtless had the information. Recurrence of these broad undefined expressions
indicates a desire to retain discretion so that in appropriate circumstances an
answer can be compelled.' 5 One "appropriate" circumstance should be where the
interrogated party could obtain the information simply for the asking. If the interrogated party would be unduly burdened in obtaining the information, for
example if his source refused to co-operate for fear of being liable over, then he
could state this in his answer.
Another approach to the control aspect of availability may be to treat it as
some federal decisions have treated interrogatories calling for opinions, i.e. the
idea that the test is whether the interrogatory serves any purpose in leading to
evidence or in narrowing the issues. If the interrogatory imposes no undue burden, an opinion answer will be required.' 6 Whether an opinion answer is objectionable is a matter of degree, resting on the facts of each case. Applying the
same reasoning to the availability problem, the interrogated party should be
compelled to answer, even if his control over the source is tenuous, if he can get
the information with no undue burden and if the lawsuit is expedited.
The danger of Rooney is the creation of a precedent that the availability of
information sought must clearly be within the knowledge or immediate control
of the interrogated party. Such a dogmatic and inflexible view impedes the pretrial discovery. Instead, the trial judge should have discretion to broadly in-

13. Steelman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 10; Wycoff v.
Nichols, supra note 10; Levatino Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., supra
note 10.
14. Beckley v. Aktieselskabet Glittre, 32 F.R.D. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Magee
v. Carvehicle Corp., 7 FED. RULES Smtv.2d 33.22, Case 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Levatino Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., supra note 10; Bank of Greece v.
Goulandris, supra note 10; Hornung v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 11 F.R.D.
300 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappi, 11 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also 4 MOORE, op. Cit.
supra note 10.
15. See Nesbitt v. Hauck, 15 F.R.D. 254 (D.S.D. 1954), indicating that in
appropriate circumstances the court would require interrogated parties to seek
information they do not possess, and Heng Hsin Co. v. Stern, Morgenthau & Co.,
20 FED. RULES SERv. 33.42, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), where court said interrogated
party was negligent in letting employee with the sought after information leave
his employment without revealing the information, and granted a motion to compel answers.
16. Meese v. Eaton Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Rowe
Spacarb, Inc. v. Cole Products Corp., 21 F.R.D. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Territory
of Alaska v. The Arctic Maid, 135 F. Supp. 164 (D. Alaska 1955); 4 MooRn op.
cit. supra note 4, at 318. But the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hof v.
Cloyd, 394 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. En Banc 1965), and in State ex rel. Gamble Constr.
Co. v. Carroll, s=pra note 4, has said that the interrogated party should not be
required to express opinions. A distinction may be made between opinions of fact
and opinions of law. Zinsky v. New York Cent. R.R., 36 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Ohio

1964).
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terpret the availability requirement, and, if the circumstances dictate, to com17
pel an answer.
Jon Z. WILLIAMS

17. See State ex rel. Hof v. Cloyd, supra note 16, at 411, saying that the determination of whether the questions are proper in form or substance is for the
trial court. See also State ex rel. Houser v. Goodman, 406 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1966), saying that in discovery cases the appellate court will not issue a
writ of prohibition in every case where it thinks the trial court's interim order
was erroneous, but that the parties in most cases must be confined to a review
of the order on appeal from final judgment. This may indicate that the trial
judge's discretion in the discovery area will not be disturbed; even if erroneous,
unless it has affected the outcome.
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